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Abstract
This Note analyzes the Green Protective Order, and the arguments of its proponents and critics.
It aims to facilitate broader public awareness of an issue that, while not commanding newspaper
headlines, may actually have greater consequence for Guanta´namo prisoners and their counsel than
those issues that do attract mass media attention. Part I provides a brief background on protective
orders in general and their use in cases involving confidential national security, before examining
the Green Protective Order in detail. Part II considers, in detail, three different assessments of the
Green Protective Order named above, as these positions have been articulated in court submis-
sions and other sources. In doing so, Part II emphasizes the considerable distance between the
parties’ positions. Finally, Part III of this Note interrogates the Government’s purported motive
in seeking a more restrictive protective order, and argues that the Green Protective Order already
substantially compromises lawyers’ ability to effectively represent prisoners at Guanta´namo. It
also urges counsel for Guanta´namo prisoners to continue to make courts and the general public
aware of the restrictions placed upon their advocacy, and the consequences these restrictions have
for their clients.
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INTRODUCTION
For as long as there have been legal challenges to the deten-
tion of prisoners1 at the U.S. naval base at Guantdnamo Bay,
Cuba, ("GuantAnamo") ,2 courts hearing such cases have con-
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sentation of several prisoners at GuantAnamo. The author sincerely thanks Professors
Martha Rayner and Ramzi Kassem for their guidance, the Volume XXX Editors of the
Fordham International Law Journal for their feedback, and Mandy Tang for her support.
1. People imprisoned at Guantdnamo are often called "detainees," following the
lead of the Government, which has avoided the term "prisoners" to avoid implying that
the people at Guant~namo are prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions. See
JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 255 n.3 (2006)
(explaining author's choice of word "prisoners" throughout that book); see also STEPHEN
GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM (2006) (using
term "prisoners" to describe people in U.S. custody at GuantAnamo and elsewhere).
The Government may also use the term "detainees" to avoid implying that prisoners'
detention is punitive. See Navy Rear Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., Op-Ed., Inside Guanta-
namo Bay, CHI. TmB., May 17, 2006, at 27 (characterizing Guant~namo as "detention
camp," not "prison camp" because Guant'namo detention is intended to be neither
punitive nor rehabilitative). For the sake of simplicity and candor, this Note refers to
people imprisoned at Guantdnamo as "prisoners." This Note also follows the practice
of spelling "Guantunamo" with an accent over the second letter "a," as written in Span-
ish, except where quoting a document that does not use this accent in spelling the
word.
2. The United States' current use of GuantAnamo began on January 11, 2002,
when the first planeload of prisoners arrived at Guant~namo from Afghanistan. See
Steve Vogel, U.S. Takes Hooded, Shackled Detainees to Cuba, WASH. PoST, Jan. 11, 2002, at
A10 (reporting arrival of prisoners at Guantinamo); see also MARGULIES, supra note 1, at
4 (describing arrival of prisoners). The first petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of prisoners at Guantfnamo was filed by a group of clergy, lawyers, and law
professors nine days after the prisoners arrived, on January 20, 2002; it was subsequently
dismissed for want of standing and jurisdiction. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F.
Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (dismissing petition), affd 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.
2002); see alsoJeffAdler, U.S. Judge Dismisses Challenge to Detentions, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
2002, at A15 (reporting dismissal). Shortly thereafter, the Center for Constitutional
Rights filed several other habeas corpus suits in federal court on behalf of prisoners
David Hicks, Asif Iqbal, and Shafiq Rasul. See John Mintz, Detention of 3 Men in Cuba
Disputed, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2002, at A1O (reporting filing of habeas corpus suits); see
also MARGULIES, supra note 1, at 9-10 (describing circumstances of decision to challenge
prisoners' detention). These suits remain pending. Since 2002, several hundred Guan-
tAnamo prisoners have sought habeas corpus. See, e.g., John Does 1-570 v. Bush, No. 05
Civ. 313, 2006 WL 3096685 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2006) (dismissing suit seeking habeas
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fronted a tension between the Government's desire to restrict
access to certain information about the prisoners, the base, and
other aspects of the Government's "War on Terror," and the
prisoners' lawyers' need to access some of the same information
to effectively represent their clients.3 The federal district courts
of the District of Columbia4 have generally dealt with this situa-
tion by implementing protective orders to govern the circum-
stances under which Guantdnamo prisoners and their counsel
may access and use confidential information possessed by the
Government.5 In the interest of judicial consistency and effi-
ciency, most courts handling Guantdnamo prisoners' cases have
adopted the same protective order, modeled after the protective
order issued on November 8, 2004, by U.S. District Judge Joyce
Hens Green.6
Entitled "Amended Protective Order and Procedures for
Counsel Access to Detainees at the United States Naval Base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba," Judge Green's protective order (the
"Green Protective Order") specifies rules governing the access to
and use of confidential or otherwise protected information
learned in the course of Guantdnamo litigation.7 Significantly, it
corpus for 570 unnamed Guantinamo prisoners); see a/soJosh White, Levin Protests Move
to Dismiss Detainee Petitions, WASH. PosT, Jan. 5, 2006, at A02 (noting, in article about
legislation crafted to deny prisoners habeas corpus rights, that Center for Constitu-
tional Rights represents "hundreds" of Guant~namo prisoners).
3. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175 (D.D.C. 2004)
(noting "classified national security information" and "other protected information"
involved in Guantnamo habeas corpus litigation); see also Adem v. Bush, 425 F. Supp.
2d 7, 14-26 (2006) (negotiating between need to protect information and need to facili-
tate counsel access).
4. Prisoners at Guantdnamo have generally filed petitions for habeas corpus in
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481
(2004) (confirming District Court's jurisdiction over habeas corpus suit brought by pris-
oner at Guantdnamo); see also Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 433 F. Supp. 2d 58, 65 (D.D.C. 2006)
(same).
5. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 175 (implementing
original protective order); Adem v. Bush, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 10-12, 19 (discussing his-
tory and ubiquity of protective order); Qasim v. Bush, No. 05-cv-01179, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C.
Aug. 2, 2006) (implementing protective order and noting its use in "vast majority" of
Guantinamo habeas corpus cases); see also Geri L. Dreiling, Changing the Ground Rules:
DOJ Proposes New Limits on Lawyer Access to Detainees, Data, 5 No. 44 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 1
(Nov. 3, 2006) (last visited Feb. 10, 2007), http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/
n3terror.html (reporting protective order used in more than 200 cases).
6. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174 at 174-183 (imple-
menting original protective order); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting ubiquity of
protective order).
7. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 174-75 (describing
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also specifies requirements for access to and communication
with the prisoners at Guantinamo themselves-restrictions that
generally have not appeared in other cases potentially involving
national security information.8 Most counsel representing pris-
oners at Guantdnamo are by now quite familiar with its regula-
tions governing attorney-client communications, use of classified
information, and other matters-indeed, they are required to
affirm as much before they ever meet their clients or file any-
thing on their behalf.9
In spite of the Green Protective Order's ubiquity, it remains
somewhat controversial.1 ° Some counsel for Guantdnamo pris-
oners consider the Order a necessary aspect of a case involving
national security matters, and even embrace the protections it
provides them.11 Other counsel chafe against the restrictions it
purpose of protective order as establishing procedures to be followed by petitioners,
counsel, translators, and other individuals who receive access to certain information or
documents in connection with Guant~namo cases); Dreiling, supra note 5 (characteriz-
ing protective order as "ground rules" governing access to clients and information);
Neha S. Gohill & Shams S. Mitha, Representing Guanidnamo Bay Detainees, 35 A.B.A. FALL
BRIEF 68 (2005) (describing purpose of protective order at Guant~namo).
8. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 191-92 (requiring
counsel to sign memorandum of understanding agreeing to abide by protective order).
9. Pursuant to the Green Protective Order, attorneys representing prisoners at
GuantAnamo must sign a declaration affirming their awareness of and agreement to
abide by the terms of the protective order. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F.
Supp. 2d at 191-92 (including sample memorandum of understanding and statement of
acknowledgement to be signed by counsel); Adem v. Bush, No. 05-cv-723, 2006 WL
1193853, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2006) (noting filing of memorandum of understanding
in that case, pursuant to Green Protective Order); see also Gohill & Mitha, supra note 7
(describing requirement that counsel adhere to rules of Green Protective Order).
10. See generally Dreiling, supra note 5 (discussing current dispute about Green Pro-
tective Order); Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 10-12 (discussing, in decision ruling on proper
interpretation of Green Protective Order, various disputed aspects of that order).
11. See, e.g., Pet'r's Opp'n to Resp's Mot. for Entry of a Protective Order and
Pet'r's Mot. for Referral to a Special Master, Bismullah & Wali v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-cv-
1197, at *14,19 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed
Protective Order] (arguing, in opposition to Government's motion to implement pro-
tective order more restrictive than Green Protective Order, that protective order impli-
cates substantial issues of national security and the safety of U.S. service personnel, but
that after two years, Green Protective Order has proven "generally successful"; Pet'r's
Mem. (I) in Opp'n. to Repondents' [sic] Cross Mot. to Enter Proposed Protective Or-
der and Stay Proceedings, and (II) in Further Support of Pets' Emergency Mot. for an
Order Setting Procedures Governing Pet. for Immediate Relief and Other Relief under
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Parhat v. Gates, No. 06-cv-1397, at *8-13 (D.C. Cir. Jan.
3, 2007) [hereinafter Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order] (arguing for appro-
priateness of Green Protective Order); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (quoting various
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imposes.' 2 In its continued opposition to prisoner access to the
courts and attorney access to Guantinamo, 13 the Government
has complained that the Green Protective Order is not restrictive
enough to adequately protect national security. 4
This is by no means a purely academic debate. Recently, in
cases brought by two Guant~namo prisoners under the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA")," the Government has asked
counsel for Guant~namo prisoners about importance of attorney access provisions of
Green Protective Order).
12. See, e.g., Pet'r's Mot. to Vacate Order Entered Dec. 16, 2004, Applying Protec-
tive Order, Paracha v. Bush, No. 04-cv-2022 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2005), mot. denied, Paracha
v. Bush, No. 04-cv-2022 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Paracha Mot. to Vacate]
(criticizing Green Protective Order as too restrictive); see also Gohil & Mithra, supra
note 7 (describing logistical challenges to counsel posed by Green Protective Order,
including invasive background check, limited number of security clearances allotted
per law firm, strict rules governing confidential information, and lack of traditional
administrative support due to sensitivity of information involved).
13. See MARGULIES, supra note 1, at 25-28 (discussing Defense Department resis-
tance to attorneys meeting clients at Guant~namo; explaining Government resistance to
attorney and court access as fueled by belief that contact with attorneys would be "disas-
trous to the sense of dependency and trust that [U.S. Government] interrogators are
attempting to create. The prisoner must realize that his welfare is wholly in the hands
of his interrogators, and that help is not on the way." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); see also Carol D. Leonnig, U.S. Stymies Detainee Access Despite Ruling, Lawyers Say,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2004, at All (reporting continued Government efforts to resist
attorney visits to base following Rasul ruling permitting access).
14. See Mot. for Entry of Protective Order, Bismullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-cv-1197
(D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2006), at *1 [hereinafter Gov't Mot. for Protective Order] (arguing for
more restrictive protective order); see also Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 10-12 (discussing
Government efforts to limit access even beyond Green Protective Order).
15. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 119
Stat. 2680, 2739-45 (2005), (hereinafter DTA) (amending 2005 Defense Department
appropriations bill passed by the House of Representatives). Designed to prevent the
inhumane treatment of prisoners at Guant~namo and elsewhere by requiring that inter-
rogators avail themselves of only those techniques included in the U.S. Army Field Man-
ual on Intelligence Interrogation, see DTA § 1002(a), the DTA also contains a clause
that purports to divest the federal district courts ofjurisdiction over Guantdnamo pris-
oners' habeas corpus claims, granting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any
final decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") that an alien is properly
detained as an enemy combatant. See DTA § 1005(e) (purporting to grant D.C. Circuit
exclusive jurisdiction); see also Josh White, Detainees Face Limited Access to Courts, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 24, 2005, at A04 (reporting on jurisdiction-limiting aspects of DTA). The
constitutionality of the DTA has been questioned, and is currently under consideration
by the D.C. Circuit in the consolidated cases of Al Odah v. United States, No. 05-cv-5062
(D.C. Cir.) and Boumediene v. Bush, No. 05-cv-5064 (D.C. Cir.). See Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld, 548 U.S. -, 126 S. Ct 2749, at 2765 (2006) (acknowledging dispute over constitu-
tionality of DTA; finding no need to address DTA constitutionality in instant case); see
also Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L.R. 333, 349-50 (2006)
(discussing whether DTA violates Suspension Clause (Art. I, § 9, cl. 2) of U.S. Constitu-
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the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (the
"D.C. Circuit") to enter a protective order significantly more re-
strictive than the Green Protective Order, including even stricter
rules for counsel access to and communication with prisoners. t6
If the D.C. Circuit enters a more restrictive order, it could re-
place the Green Protective Order as the new standard protective
order entered in Guantdnamo cases; and the impact on both
prisoners and counsel will be dramatic indeed. 17 This debate
may have even broader consequences for any litigation involving
information classified on the grounds of national security.18
This Note analyzes the Green Protective Order, and the ar-
guments of its proponents and critics. It aims to facilitate
broader public awareness of an issue that, while not command-
ing newspaper headlines, may actually have greater consequence
for Guantdnamo prisoners and their counsel more than those
issues that do attract mass media attention.19 Part I provides a
brief background on protective orders in general and their use
in cases involving confidential national security, before examin-
ing the Green Protective Order in detail. Part II considers, in
detail, three different assessments of the Green Protective Order
named above, as these positions have been articulated in court
submissions and other sources. In doing so, Part II emphasizes
the considerable distance between the parties' positions. Finally,
Part III of this Note interrogates the Government's purported
motive in seeking a more restrictive protective order, and argues
tion). To date, two Guantinamo prisoners, Haji Bismullah and Huzaifa Parhat, have
brought cases pursuant to the DTA in the D.C. Circuit. See Bismullah v. Rumsfeld, No.
06-cv-1197 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Parhatv. Gates, No. 06-cv-1397 (D.C. Cir. 2006). These two
cases represent a focal point of the debate over the appropriateness of the Green Pro-
tective Order (and are thus a primary focus of this Note). See supra note 10 (collecting
sources that object, in context of cases brought pursuant to DTA, to Government's
Proposed Protective Order, which would be more restrictive than Green Protective Or-
der).
16. See generally Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14; Dreiling, supra note
5 (reporting Government's motion).
17. See Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting possible consequences of stricter protective
order, including reduced access to counsel); cf Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 19-21(2006)
(noting importance of protective order in protecting prisoners' rights).
18. See Dreiling, supra note 5 (discussing potentially broad consequences of pro-
tective order litigation); see also In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at
174-75 (describing importance of protective order in protecting classified information).
19. See Dreiling, supra note 5 (discussing consequences of litigation for prisoners);
see also In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 174-75 (describing impor-
tance of protective order).
2007] 877
878 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:873
that the Green Protective Order already substantially com-
promises lawyers' ability to effectively represent prisoners at
Guantinamo. It also urges counsel for Guant~namo prisoners to
continue to make courts and the general public aware of the
restrictions placed upon their advocacy, and the consequences
these restrictions have for their clients.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Protective Orders in General
1. Purpose
A protective order is a court order that prohibits or restricts
a party from engaging in conduct, especially a legal procedure
such as discovery, that unduly annoys or burdens the opposing
party or a third-party witness.2" Protective orders are used in
both civil2" and criminal22 contexts to limit discovery for various
reasons, 23 to control contact between parties and between par-
20. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (2nd pocket ed. 2001) 567 (defining "protective
order"). The term "protective order" is also occasionally used as a synonym of "re-
straining order," such as those typically granted in domestic violence cases. See id. (not-
ing various uses of term).
21. In civil cases in federal court, protective orders are governed by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(c) ("Rule 26(c)"). FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). That rule grants federal
district courts the broad power to issue, upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, "any order which justice requires to protect a party or a
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." See
generally 8 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDwARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2036, 2043 (2d ed. 2006) (describing grounds for applica-
tion of Rule 26(c) in protective order context; collecting case law governing interpreta-
tion of Rule 26(c) and application to protective orders).
22. In criminal cases in federal court, protective orders are governed by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1) ("Rule 16(d)"), which grants federal district
courts broad discretion to deny, restrict, or defer discovery upon a party's showing of
need. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d). See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21,
§ 258 (describing grounds for application of Rule 16(d) in protective order context;
collecting case law governing interpretation of Rule 16(d) and application to protective
orders).
23. See United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 666 F.2d 364, 368-69 (9th
Cir. 1982 (characterizing protective orders under Rule 26(c) as safeguard for protec-
tion of parties and witnesses in view of broad discovery rights authorized in Rule 26(b));
Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 55 F.RD. 88, 89 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (noting trial
courts' broad powers to regulate discovery); Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Get-
ting Control of Waiver of Privilege in Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence
502, 58 S.C. L. REv. 211, 240 (2006) (observing that federal courts undoubtedly possess
power to limit use of information obtained in discovery). See generally WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 21, § 2036.
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ties and witnesses, 24 and to protect confidential information
from public disclosure, 25 among other uses.26 Those to whom a
protective order applies must abide by its rules; violators may
face sanctions for contempt of court,2 7  or even criminal
charges. 28
Federal district courts possess broad discretion to issue pro-
24. Contact between parties and witnesses may be controlled either to ensure the
safety of witnesses, or to safeguard the integrity of proceedings by preventing perjury
through the intimidation of witnesses. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21,
§ 258, n.5 (observing that Advisory Committee Note to 1975 amendments to Rule
16(d) (1) indicate that protective order should be entered when there is reason to be-
lieve that a witness would be subject to physical or economic harm if his identity is
revealed); United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 708 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding trial
court's decision to bar criminal defendant from hearing tape recordings of her own
voice, when access to recordings might jeopardize safety of individuals cooperating in
case); United States v. Price, 448 F. Supp. 503, 507-18 (D.Co. 1978) (analyzing, across
federal circuits, allowable scope of discovery where criminal defendant asks for names
of government witnesses; noting both "safety of witnesses" and "perjury or witness intim-
idation" as possible circumstances for application of protective order); see also A.B.A.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 2d ed. 1980, § 11-2.5(b) (providing that in certain
circumstances court may deny disclosure where there is substantial risk to any person of
physical harm, intimidation, or bribery, if that risk is not outweighed by usefulness of
disclosure to the defense).
25. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co. 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. Del 1985)
(holding, in dispute between cola company and bottler, that secret formula for Coca-
Cola, even though extremely valuable trade secret, was also central to litigation of the
parties' dispute; ordering formula's disclosure but issuing protective order limiting ex-
tent of disclosure and manner in which plaintiff could use this information); see also
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating factors to
be considered in court's evaluation of whether commercial information justifies protec-
tive order); DDS v. Lucas Aerospace Power Transmission Co., 182 F.R.D. 1, 4-5
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (same). See generally FRANCIS H. HARE ET AL., CONFIDENTIALITY ORDERS
(1988).
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (empowering courts to issue any order that justice
requires to protect party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21, § 2036
(observing impossibility of setting out in a rule all of the circumstances that may require
limitations on discovery or the kinds of limitations that may be needed).
27. See, e.g., McDonald v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 8:01-cv-1306-T-27, 2005
WL 2810707 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2005) (approving magistrate judge's recommendation
of monetary sanctions for party's violation of protective order to limit disclosure of
confidential business information); Nevil v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 294-015, 1999 WL
1338625 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 1999) (ordering sanctions for party's violation of protective
order governing use of confidential trade secrets).
28. See United States v. Sunguard Data Systems, 173 F. Supp. 2d 20, 30 (D.D.C.
2001) (issuing protective order governing access to confidential information; requiring
parties to affirm their subjection, without limitation, to civil and criminal penalties for
contempt of Court); United States v. Flemmi, 233 F. Supp. 2d 75, 86 (D. Mass. 2000)
(citing rule; noting that violations of protective order, perhaps in conjunction with vio-
lations of other court rules, could include imprisonment for criminal contempt).
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tective orders. 29 This power arises both from the federal rules of
procedure and the inherent power of district courts to supervise
their proceedings.3 ° Given this broad authority, protective or-
ders may be as general or as specific as the judge deems appro-
priate.31 They may be, and often are, tailored to meet the exi-
gencies of individual cases,3 2 but they may also be lifted as boiler-
plate from orders issued in similar cases.33 The broad authority
of the district court also encompasses the authority to amend or
dissolve protective orders as needed.34 In making such determi-
nations, judges must weigh the competing interests of parties
and witnesses, as well as the general public's interest in public
proceedings. 35 Given the broad discretion of the district court
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (empowering courts to issue "any order which justice
requires to protect a party or a person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense"); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21, § 2036
(characterizing Rule 26(c) as emphasizing court's "complete control" over discovery
process and limitations thereupon); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir. 1973)
(stating that "grant and nature of protection is within discretion of the district court
and may be reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion"); Chem. & Indus.
Co. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1962) (same), see also Broun & Capra, supra
note 23 at 240 (stating that protective orders, especially those involving trade secrets,
"abound and are universally upheld").
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (empowering courts to issue protective orders); see also
Chem. & Indus. Co. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126 at 129 (noting that extent of discovery and
use of protective orders is within the discretion of the trial judge).
31. See Chem. & Indus. Co. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126 at 129 (stating broad scope of
court's discretion to craft protective orders); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 21, § 2036 n.6 and accompanying text (noting that court may be as inventive as
necessary to achieve the "benign purposes" of Rule 26(c); providing examples of partic-
ularly inventive protective orders).
32. See Chem. & Indus. Co. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126 at 129 (stating broad scope of
court's discretion to craft protective orders); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 21, § 2036 (providing examples of orders designed to meet requirements of indi-
vidual cases).
33. See Reyes v. Freeberry, No. 02-1283-KAJ, 2005 WL 3560724, *5 (D. Del. 2005)
(stating acceptability of boilerplate terms in protective order governing confidential
information); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting common protective order in many
Guantinamo habeas corpus cases).
34. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (stating courts' "inherent power" to enforce compliance with their lawful or-
ders); see also In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d
Cir. 1987) (stating that Rule 26(c) protective order is subject to modification); United
Nuclear Co. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that
court retains power to modify its protective order even where underlying suit is dis-
missed); WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21, § 2044 (collecting case law on modi-
fying protective orders; noting that protective orders are "flexible devices").
35. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952, 959-60 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(noting that Rule 26(c) requires individualized balancing of many interests present in a
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in these matters, the propriety of protective orders is subject to
only limited appellate review.36
2. Protective Orders and Confidential Information
Traditionally, protective orders have been used in both civil
and criminal cases to govern the use of confidential information
by attorneys and others who, in the course of litigation, become
privy to confidential information. 7 Frequently, such protective
particular case); see also Ramirez Rodrfguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals,
425 F.3d 67 (lst Cir. 2005) (citing Microsoft, noting district court's willingness to work
with parties to balance physicians' privacy and safety concerns with interest in con-
ducting discovery). See generally SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON PROTECTIVE
ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICES
ADDRESSING PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES 5-20
(rev. public comment draft, 2005), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/
content/miscFiles/publications-html (discussing contours of public's right of access to
information in public proceedings; recommending that public have qualified right of
access to a variety of court documents; advocating prerogative of non-parties, upon
proper showing, to intervene to challenge protective order that limits disclosure of oth-
erwise discoverable information).
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (stating limits of appellate review of
district court protective orders).
37. In the civil context, protective orders designed to prevent the unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information tend to arise in litigation involving commercial
secrets. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21, § 2043 (collecting civil cases in-
volving confidential information subject to limited disclosure under protective order;
noting use of protective orders to protect trade secrets and other confidential research,
development, or commercial information); see also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola
Co. 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. Del 1985) (holding, in dispute between cola company and bot-
tler, that secret formula for Coca-Cola, even though an extremely valuable trade secret,
was also central to the litigation of the parties' dispute; ordering formula's disclosure
but issuing protective order limiting extent of disclosure and manner in which plaintiff
could use this information); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 203
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating factors to be considered in court's evaluation of whether com-
mercial information justifies protective order); DDS v. Lucas Aerospace Power Trans-
mission Co., 182 F.R.D. 1, 4-5 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (same). See generally FRANCIS H. HARE ET
AL., CONFIDENTIALITY ORDERS (1988). Frequently such protective orders are designed
not to completely bar a party from access to certain information which may be crucial
to that party's case, but rather to limit who may have access to disclosed confidential
information, and what they may do with this information. See, e.g., Covey Oil Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1965) (granting limited but not absolute
access to certain trade secrets); Coca-Cola, 107 F.R.D. 288 at 300 (limiting access to and
disclosure of formula for Coca-Cola). In the criminal context, protective orders may be
issued where the prosecution wishes to prevent the defense from learning, or revealing
to others, sensitive information relevant to the prosecution's investigation of the case.
See, e.g., United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 708 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding trial
court decision to grant protective order denying defense to access tape-recording of
defendant's voice, where hearing voice might identify government collaborator);
United States v. Aiken, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (stating that where
882 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:873
orders limit both what information attorneys may disclose to the
general public, and how they may use information learned in
the course of litigation.
In cases involving confidential information deemed by the
court to be vital to national security, federal district courts have
often structured protective orders to restrict access to certain in-
formation. 9 In addition to the sources of authority named
above, federal district courts crafting such orders have also typi-
cally relied upon the Classified Information Procedures Act
("CIPA")4 ° and the Procedures established pursuant to that Act
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.4'
As protective orders governing confidential national secur-
ity information vary greatly from case to case,42 a comprehensive
the government has reason to believe that the defendant may make improper attempts
to influence government witness before trial, it can seek protective order). To the ex-
tent that criminal cases may compromise business secrets, a protective order may also
be issued by a criminal court to limit access to or use of certain information. See United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 232 F. Supp. 664, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (issuing, in
criminal antitrust case, protective order limiting discovery of defendants' competitors'
records to protect trade secrets); United States v. Int'l Machines Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 44-
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); (noting that commercial information may be offered some protect-
tion in the criminal proceeding).
38. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21, § 2043 (noting most common
type of protective order is order limiting who may access information disclosed and how
they may use this information).
39. See United States v. McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441, 1451 (D. Colo. 1997) (invok-
ing Rule 16(d) in ordering parties to comply with court-specified guidelines restricting
defendant's access to certain evidence, some of which included national security infor-
mation); United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. Va. 2002) (noting that
courts should endeavor to ensure that protective orders designed to protect national
security are not overly broad); United States v. Moussaoui, No. Crim. 01-455-A, 2002 WL
1311736, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2002) (issuing protective order governing defendant's
access to and use of "Sensitive Security Information" regarding aviation); see also A.B.A.
Standards for CriminalJustice § 11-2.6(c) (1969) (stating that disclosure of information
related to national security shall not be required where it involves substantial risk of
grave prejudice to national security and where a failure to disclose will not infringe
constitutional rights of the accused).
40. See Confidential Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. 3, §§ 1-16 [here-
inafter CIPA] (governing disclosure of classified information); see also Ellen C. Yaroshef-
sky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III Courts, EISA, CIPA and Ethical Dilem-
mas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'v & ETHICSJ. 203, 209-217 (2006) (discussing ethical issues
raised by CIPA).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 453-59 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (inter-
preting CIPA in context of protective order in criminal case); see also Aref v. United
States, 452 F.3d 202, 204 (2nd Cir. 2006) (noting district court's implementation of
protective order pursuant to CIPA).
42. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21, § 2036 n.6 and accompanying
text (providing examples of particularly inventive protective orders); id. at § 2043 (not-
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analysis of their use in cases involving confidential national se-
curity information is beyond the scope of this Note. But two ex-
amples, drawn from two recent and particularly high-profile
cases, are instructive in demonstrating how protective orders
have been crafted to govern the use of and access to confidential
national security information.
In the criminal espionage case of United States v. Hanssen, a
former Federal Bureau of Intelligence ("FBI") counterintel-
ligence agent was accused of selling U.S. intelligence secrets, in-
cluding signals information, the names of spies, and the location
of a secret tunnel, to the Soviet Union.4 3 The FBI has described
Hanssen's actions, which took place over a fifteen-year period, as
among the most damaging instances of espionage in its history.44
Prosecuting the case in the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia, the Government moved for a protective
order to prevent the unauthorized disclosure or dissemination
of certain national security information.45 Invoking CIPA, the
Court implemented a protective order governing the circum-
stances under which the defendant, his lawyers, and their assist-
ants (collectively, "the defense") could access classified informa-
tion.46 The order permitted the defense to access classified doc-
uments and information "as required by the government's
discovery obligations and otherwise as necessary to prepare for
ing that varieties of protective orders are limited only by the "needs of the situation and
the ingenuity of court and counsel").
43. See Indictment, U.S. v. Hanssen, No. 01-cr-188A (E.D. Va. May 16, 2001) (dkt.
26) (charging Hanssen with twenty-one counts of espionage and related crimes); see also
Michael Killian, FBI Spy Hanssen Gets Life, Apologizes, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 2002, at I (re-
porting Hanssen's sentencing).
44. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, REVIEW OF FBI SECURITY PROGRAMS 1 (2002), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/05publications/websterreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2007)
(describing Hanssen's treason as worst in FBI history); see also ELAINE SHARON & ANN
BLACKMAN, THE Spy NEXT DOOR: THE EXTRAORDINARY SECRET LIFE OF ROBERT PHILIP
HANSSEN, THE MOST DAMAGING FBI AGENT IN U.S. HISTORY (2002).
45. See Mot. by United States as to Robert Philip Hanssen Mot. for Protective Or-
der and Incorporated Mem. of Law, No. 01-cr-188A (E.D. Va. May 16, 2001) (dkt. 17)
(requesting protective order).
46. See Protective Order and Incorporated Mem. of Law, No. 01-cr-188A (E.D. Va.
May 16, 2001) (dkt. 18) [hereinafter Hanssen Protective Order] (granting, on basis of
CIPA and other grounds, protective order governing Hanssen case); see also Terry
Frieden, Judge Orders Secrets Protected in Spy Case, CNN.coM, Mar. 6, 2001, available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/LAW/03/06/spy.protective.order/index.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2007) (reporting issuance of protective order).
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proceedings. ''4 7 It forbade the defense from disclosing classified
documents and information to any unauthorized person.48
Though the order enjoined the defendant from disclosing any
confidential information learned before the case to any unau-
thorized person, it made clear that defense counsel and their
assistants would be authorized to receive such information, pro-
vided that they possessed a security clearance and agreed to
abide by the security procedures.49 These security procedures
included accessing classified documents only at a secure facility,
and filing court documents via a designated Court Security Of-
ficer charged with deciding whether filings should be made pub-
lic or kept under seal.5°
In United States v. Lindh, a U.S. citizen was charged with con-
spiracy to murder U.S. citizens or nationals as well as a variety of
other crimes arising from his involvement with the Taliban in
Afghanistan.5" That case involved a number of protective orders
and modifications to those orders.52 The main protective order
governing classified national security information in this case ex-
47. See Hanssen Protective Order, supra note 46, 10 (specifying terms of access to
classified documents); see also Frieden, supra note 46 (describing terms of access speci-
fied in order).
48. See Hanssen Protective Order, supra note 46, at It 16, 18 (forbidding unautho-
rized disclosure of confidential information); see also Frieden, supra note 46 (reporting
on order's nondisclosure requirements).
49. See Hanssen Protective Order, supra note 46, at 10 (authorizing defense
counsel, and additional individuals whose assistance the defense reasonably requires, to
access classified information pursuant to terms of protective order); see also Frieden,
supra note 46 (noting defense team granted access to secrets).
50. See Hanssen Protective Order, supra note 46, at 13-15 (specifying require-
ments); see also Frieden, supra note 46 (describing terms of access specified in order).
51. See Indictment, United States v. Lindh, No. 02-cr-37A (dkt. 13) (E.D. Va. Feb.
5, 2002) (indicting Lindh); see also Editorial, JusticeforJohn Walker Lindh?, WASH. POST,
July 20, 2002, at A20 (comparing Lindh's twenty-year sentence to sentences issued to
white-collar criminals).
52. See, e.g., Order as to John Phillip Walker Lindh, for Reasons Stated from the
Bench and without Objection, Granting the [134-1] Mot. for Partial Modification of
[111-1] Protective Order Regarding Unclassified Detainee Interview Reports, United
States v. Lindh, No. 02-cr-37A (dkt. 136) (E.D. Va. May 6, 2002) (modifying order re-
garding Guant~namo prisoner interview materials); Protective Order Granting [213-11
Mot. by USA and John Phillip Walker Lindh for Entry of Proposed Protective Order
Regarding True Names of Active Military Personnel as to John Phillip Walker Lindh,
United States v. Lindh, No. 02-cr-37A (dkt. 221) (E.D. Va. June 12, 2002) (forbidding
counsel from disseminating true names of certain military personnel involved in case);
Supplemental Protective Order as toJohn Phillip Walker Lindh, United States v. Lindh,
No. 02-cr-37A (dkt. 266) (E.D. Va. June 24, 2002) (designating certain documents as
sensitive and thus protected under order).
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plicitly forbade the defendant, John Walker Lindh, from any ac-
cess to classified information without the consent of the Govern-
ment or the permission of the Court.53 Similar to the order in
Hanssen, the order in Lindh required defense counsel to possess
a security clearance, agree to abide by the security procedures,
access classified information only at a secure facility, and submit
filings through a Court Security Officer. 4 As in Hanssen, the or-
der in Lindh restricted the defense from disclosing confidential
information to unauthorized persons.55 Unlike the order in
Hanssen, however, the protective order in Lindh did not explic-
itly state that defense counsel and their assistants should be
given access to classified information as required by discovery
obligations or otherwise necessary to prepare for proceedings. 56
Neither the protective order in Hanssen nor Lindh purported to
restrict counsel's access to the defendant himself, or to restrict
attorney-client communications not involving confidential infor-
mation.57
B. Protective Orders in the Guantdnamo Context
1. Guantdnamo Prisoners' Access to Counsel
A prison camp built to contain people captured during the
U.S. Government's "War on Terror," interrogate them for infor-
53. See Protective Order, United States v. Lindh, No. 02-cr-37A (dkt. 31) (E.D. Va.
Feb. 27, 2002) at 14 [hereinafter Lindh Protective Order] (ordering that defendant
shall not have any access to classified information except under specified circum-
stances); see also Radack v. Department ofJustice, No. 04-cv-01881, 2006 WL 2024978 at
*1-2 (D.D.C. July 17, 2006) (noting Lindh court's implementation of protective order).
54. See Lindh Protective Order, supra note 53, 1 9-13 (specifying requirements
for access to classified information and filing of documents); see also Radack, 2006 WL
2024978 at *1-2 (noting restricted access to documents under protective order).
55. See Lindh Protective Order, supra note 53, 1 13-14 (ordering that defense
counsel shall not disclose classified information to defendant and others without
proper authorization); see also Radack, 2006 WL 2024978 at *1-2 (adjudicating alleged
violation of protective order).
56. Compare Hanssen Protective Order, supra note 46, 10 (ordering that defense
counsel, approved employees, and others who the defense reasonably requires may ac-
cess confidential materials with permission of the court), with Lindh Protective Order,
supra note 53, 13 (making no mention of defense counsel's employees or others who
defense reasonably requires to access confidential materials).
57. Compare Hanssen Protective Order, supra note 46, 10 (limiting access to
materials, but not limiting client access or attorney-client interaction), with Lindh Pro-
tective Order, supra note 53, 13 (permitting counsel access but making no mention of
defense counsel's employees or others; not restricting attorney-client communications
involving confidential information).
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mation about terrorist activities, and perhaps to charge them
with crimes, Guant~inamo is a location with a high concentration
of secret information, some of which may be relevant to national
security.5" In part because of the secrecy of this information,
and in part because the Government's methods of interrogating
prisoners to produce such information involve creating, un-
hindered by the outside world, an environment of "debility, de-
pendence, and dread" among prisoners, the Government has
been particularly reluctant to grant lawyers access to Guantd-
namo.
59
58. See MARGULIES, supra note 1, at 23 (describing centrality of secrecy to Bush
Administration's "mosaic theory" approach to intelligence gathering); see also John
Mintz, From Veil of Secrecy, Portraits of U.S. Prisoners Emerge, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2002, at
A03 (describing Guantdnamo prisoners as "rich source of intelligence" relevant to na-
tional security). But see John Mintz, Detainees at Base in Cuba Yield Little Valuable Informa-
tion, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2002, at A15 (reporting frustration of Government officials
with quantity and quality of information learned from interrogation of Guant~namo
prisoners).
59. See MARGULIES, supra note 1, at 39 (characterizing the Bush Administration's
intentions at Guantdnamo as creating world of "debility, dependence, and dread"). Ac-
cording to Margulies,
[I] nterrogators are allowed-indeed, they are encouraged-to disorient, con-
fuse, shame, embarrass, and exhaust the prisoners, and to keep them in this
condition as long as the interrogators believe necessary. They are permitted
to traumatize the prisoners, for traumatic experiences open the greatest win-
dow of psychological vulnerability. They are expected to maintain total con-
trol over the prisoners, who are held incommunicado to maximize their sense of
"debility, dependence, and dread." In this environment, prisoners will realize,
at the most primal level, that their lives depend on nothing less than a com-
plete surrender to their interrogator. They are deprived of virtually all contact
with the outside world. At a prison like this, judges will not be allowed to
oversee interrogations and attorneys will not be allowed to interfere. At a
prison like this, interrogators operate unrestrained by the quaint niceties of
the law. To the greatest extent possible, a prison like this is lawless. Id.
See alsoJosh White, Lawyers Seek Access to 53 at Guantanamo, WASH. PosT, July 2,
2004, at A04 (reporting, following Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), that
lawyers were not yet permitted to visit prisoners at Guantdnamo). Journalists,
of course, have been invited to report from Guantnamo since the first C-130
military transport plane full of prisoners arrived from Afghanistan in early
2002); see also Steve Vogel, U.S. Takes Hooded, Shackled Detainees to Cuba, supra
note 2, at AlO (reporting first prisoners' arrival at Guant~namo). Journalists
have been consistently forbidden, however, from speaking with or otherwise
communicating with any prisoners held there. See Vikram Dodd, American Mili-
tary Bans BBC Crew from Guantanamo Bay for Talking to Inmates, GUARDIAN UN-
LIMITED, June 21, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/cuba/story/
0,1 1983,982122,00.html (last visited Feb 10., 2007) (describing journalists' at-
tempts to speak with prisoners); see also Ben Wedeman, CNN Tours Gitmo Prison
Camp, CNN.coM, July 7, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/07/06/gitmo.
tour/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) (reporting that military rules pre-
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Nevertheless, since the Supreme Court rulings in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld6 ° and Rasul v. Bush," the Government has grudgingly
permitted prisoners at Guantdnamo limited access to counsel. 2
In its arguments, however, the Government has consistently op-
posed the notion that prisoners have any fundamental right of
access to counsel;6" outside of court, a Government representa-
tive has even maligned the intentions of counsel representing
Guantdinamo prisoners.64 The precise contours of Guantdnamo
vented access to some aspects of camp including most prisoners). Likewise,
international human rights observers and members of Congress have been
permitted to visit the base, but only under carefully restricted circumstances,
and visitors are never permitted contact with prisoners. See Josh White, U.N.
Inspectors Are Invited to Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2005, at A16
(reporting international human rights observers hesitant to accept invitation
because private access to prisoners would not be permitted); see also Mike Al-
len, Lawmaker Tours Become Part of Guantanamo Life, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2005,
at A01 (describing guided tours of base as "PR push"). Lawyers, of course,
come to GuantAnamo specifically to meet and speak with their imprisoned
clients. SeeJosh White, Lawyers Seek Access, supra (reporting lawyers' demands
for unrestricted access to clients).
60. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (reversing dismissal of habeas corpus petition brought on
behalf of U.S. citizen detained indefinitely at Guantinamo and in South Carolina; hold-
ing that U.S. citizens have right to challenge their detention even if held as "enemy
combatant"); see alsoJenny S. Martinez, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 124 S.Ct. 2633. United States
Supreme Court, June 28, 2004, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (2004) (discussing decision).
61. 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that U.S. court system has jurisdiction to hear
habeas corpus petitions brought by Guantdnamo prisoners); see also David L. Schloss,
Rasul v. Bush. 124 S.Ct. 2686. United States Supreme Court, June 28, 2004, 98 AM. J. INT'L L.
788 (2004) (discussing decision).
62. Adem v. Bush, 425 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2004) (discussing counsel ac-
cess post-Rasul); In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175-192
(D.D.C. 2004) (implementing protective order governing prisoner access to counsel).
63. See, e.g., Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (noting that Government took position
that detainees' access to counsel existed "purely at the pleasure of the Government,
with restrictions imposed as it saw fit"); see also Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra
note 14 at 13 (arguing that DTA does not compel unlimited access by counsel to clients
at Guantdnamo military base). Prisoners designated to be tried by military commis-
sions, such as those found unconstitutional in Hamdan, have, however, been assigned
military defense counsel. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. _, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786
(2006) (noting defendant's right to counsel in military commission procedure); Mili-
tary Commission Order No. 1, Department of Defense, Mar. 21, 2002, at §§ 4(C) (2)-
(3), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2007) (providing that prisoners charged by military commission are
entitled to appointed military counsel and may hire civilian counsel at their own ex-
pense, provided civilian counsel is security-cleared and holds U.S. citizenship). See also
John Mintz, Military Lawyers Question Tribunal Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2004, at A07
(reporting on Supreme Court brief in which military counsel representing Guantd1-
namo criticize fairness of military commissions).
64. See John Heilprin, Views on Detainee Representation Draw Fire, WASH. POST, Jan.
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prisoners' right to legal counsel remain, as a matter of law, some-
what ambiguous. 6
5
The vast majority of suits filed by prisoners, or on their be-
half, are petitions for habeas corpus seeking a legal and factual
explanation for the prisoner's detention, or, alternatively, to free
the prisoner.66 At least two prisoners have filed suits alleging
that their detention and conditions of confinement violate the
DTA, which prohibits inhumane treatment of prisoners at Guan-
tdnamo.67 The DTA also purports to deny Guantinamo prison-
ers the right to habeas corpus relief in the federal courts, and for
14, 2007, at A05 (reporting Defense Department disavowal of comments of Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of Defense Cully Stimson, who urged companies to boycott law firms
representing Guantdnamo prisoners); Editorial, Unveiled Threats, WASH. PosT, Jan. 12,
2007, at A18 (labeling Stimson's remarks "a crude gambit on detainees' legal rights");
see also Statement of Law Deans, Yale Law School, Jan. 15, 2007, available at http://www.
law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/News&_YEvents/Law-Deans Statement9.pdf (last visited
Feb. 10, 2007) (urging, in statement signed by 130 law school deans, that Bush Adminis-
tration repudiate Stimson's remarks). Counsel representing GuantAnamo prisoners in-
variably do so for free. Since 2004, the Center for Constitutional Rights ("CCR") has
arranged for pro bono counsel for several hundred lawsuits on behalf of prisoners.
These pro bono counsel include attorneys from law firms large and small, public de-
fender groups, independent practitioners, and law school clinics. See generally CCR
Guantdnamo Global Justice Initiative Litigation Page, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/gac/
cases.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) (providing information about various cases
brought on behalf of GuantAnamo prisoners by Center for Constitutional Rights).
65. In her plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O'Connor wrote that
Hamdi, an American citizen detained as an "enemy combatant," was entitled, on due
process grounds, to a meaningful opportunity to challenge his detention; Justice
O'Connor also indicated that non-citizen prisoners alleged to be "enemy combatants"
have a right to habeas corpus. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (stating
that while "full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings
may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting... a citizen's
core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government's case and to be heard by an
impartial adjudicator" remain unassailable; stating that "Hamdi unquestionably has the
right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on remand"). Her opin-
ion refrained from ruling, however, on the question of whether alleged "enemy com-
batants" have an absolute right to counsel access, because Hamdi was eventually permit-
ted access to counsel. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539 (noting that Hamdi had been ap-
pointed counsel). The Supreme Court has not ruled on the exact contours of counsel
access for prisoners at Guantdnamo. See generally Jonathan Hafetz, Habeas Corpus, Judi-
cial Review, and Limits on Secrecy in Detentions at Guantdnamo, 5 CARDozo PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICSJ. 127, 146-59 (2006) (discussing habeas corpus rights as defining limits of coun-
sel access for prisoners, but noting ambiguity as well).
66. See, e.g., John Does 1-570 v. Bush, No. 05 Civ. 313, 2006 WL 3096685 (D.D.C.
Feb. 10, 2006) (dismissing suit seeking habeas corpus for 570 unnamed GuantAnamo
prisoners); see also MARcGutEs, supra note 1, at 46-47 (describing Guantdnamo prison-
ers' pursuit of justification for their detention via habeas corpus suits).
67. See Bismullah & Wali v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-cv-1 197, (D.C. Cir.) (filing suit under
DTA); Parhat v. Gates, No. 06-cv-1 397 (D.C. Cir.) (filing suit under DTA); see also Dreil-
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this reason its constitutionality has been challenged. 68 In part
because of the traditional strength of the Great Writ of Habeas
Corpus, habeas corpus suits have been the legal vehicle of choice
in challenging the confinement of Guantinamo prisoners.69
There are significant legal differences between a habeas
corpus suit and a DTA action. While the basis of a habeas
corpus suit is the common-law writ of habeas corpus and the
Constitution itself, as well as the federal habeas corpus statute,
the basis of a DTA action is purely statutory.7" A case brought
under the DTA is to be heard directly by the D.C. Circuit, not a
federal district court.7" Significantly, the scope of the D.C. Cir-
cuit's review over the case may be narrower than the scope of a
district court's jurisdiction over a habeas petition.7 2 The differ-
ence between a petition for habeas corpus and a suit brought
pursuant to the DTA is a key issue underlying the arguments
over the appropriateness of the Green Protective Order that are
examined in Part II of this Note.
In the course of their representation, counsel representing
prisoners in any suit against the Government-whether suing for
habeas corpus or under the DTA-normally request access to
certain information, held by the Government, that the Govern-
ment may consider classified or otherwise protected.73 First and
ing, supra note 5 (noting suits brought pursuant to DTA); supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text (describing purposes of DTA).
68. See Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting suits brought pursuant to DTA); see also supra
note 15 and accompanying text (describing purposes of DTA).
69. See Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting only two suits brought pursuant to DTA in
comparison to many habeas corpus suits); see also Hafetz, supra note 65, at 149-60 (com-
paring DTA and habeas remedies). Where counsel for Guantdnamo prisoners have
filed DTA actions, they have done so either because the habeas remedy is unavailable,
or for strategic reasons idiosyncratic to the facts of their cases. See id. (quoting habeas
attorney as stating that if habeas remedy is cut off, cases will have to be refiled under
DTA).
70. See Hafetz, supra note 65, at 150-63 (describing habeas regime in contrast to
DTA regime); see also David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another
View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 59 n.2 (2006) (discussing common law basis of Great
Writ of habeas corpus).
71. See DTA § 1005(e) (purporting to grant D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction); see
also White, supra note 15 at A04 (reporting on jurisdiction-limiting aspects of DTA).
72. See DTA § 1005(e) (3) (D) (limiting scope of review to whether CSRT tribunal
decision was consistent with its standards and procedures, as well as consistency with
Constitution and other laws of United States); see also Hafetz, supra note 65, at 149-50
(discussing limited scope of DTA review in context of broader efforts to limit all review
of prisoners' detention).
73. See, e.g., Mot. for Factual Returns, el-Mashad v. Bush, 05-cv-270 (D.D.C. Oct. 14,
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foremost, counsel normally seek access to clients themselves,
through visits to Guanttnamo, and access to clients through the
mail and, however unlikely, by telephone.7 4 Attorneys in Guan-
tdnamo litigation typically seek to meet with their clients for the
same reasons that attorneys meet with their clients in any other
context: to gather factual information from their clients about
their cases, to explain what a client's options may be, and to
make strategic choices together.75 Yet, to the extent that the
Government considers that access to prisoners at Guantdnamo
itself constitutes access to confidential and/or protected infor-
mation, the routine act of attorney-client visitation is a contested
matter.7 6
Beyond access to their clients and the information that they
may provide, counsel generally seek access to any records that
the Government may have pertaining to their client's captivity:
factual documentation alleged by the Government to justify the
prisoner's status as an "enemy combatant," medical records, in-
terrogation logs, information about other prisoners or govern-
ment officials, and a variety of other information v. 7  The Govern-
ment has opposed most of these requests.7 "
2005) (requesting government provide CSRT documents as well as other information
relevant to petitioner's captivity); Pet'r's Mot. to Allow and to Accelerate Disc., Paracha
v. Bush, No. 04-cv-2022 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2005) (requesting discovery of government
information related to petitioner's detention).
74. See, e.g.,John Does 1-570 v. Bush, No. 05 Civ. 313, 2006 AL 3096685 (D.D.C.
Feb. 10, 2006) (dismissing suit seeking, in addition to habeas relief, permission to meet
with clients, learn circumstances of their detention, and "ascertain their wishes" with
regard to filing habeas corpus petitions); see also MARGULIES, supra note 1, at 25 (stating
that lawyers for Hamdi and Padilla "did what any lawyer would do, and what lawyers had
always been allowed to do in this country: they tried to meet with their clients" but were
refused access).
75. See White, supra note 15 at A04 (reporting lawyers' demands for access to cli-
ents); see also MARGULIES, supra note 1, at 25-28 (discussing lawyers' motivations in meet-
ing clients).
76. See, e.g., Resp'ts' Opp'n to Petitioner's Mot. for Release of Papers and to Com-
pel Disc., Paracha v. Bush, No. 04-cv-2022 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2005) (requesting release of
documents and discovery); see also MARGULIES, supra note 1, at 25-28 (discussing De-
fense Department resistance to attorneys meeting clients at Guantsnamo and reluc-
tance to provide information about clients); Hafetz, supra note 65, at 146-47 (describing
Government attempts to limit counsel access).
77. See, e.g., Mot. for Factual Returns, el-Mashad v. Bush, 05-cv-270 (JR) (D.D.C.
Oct. 14, 2005) (requesting documents and information relevant to petitioner's captiv-
ity); Petitioner's Mot. to Allow and to Accelerate Disc., Paracha v. Bush, No. 04-cv-2022
(D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2005) (requesting discovery of government information related to
petitioner's detention).
78. See, e~g., Resp'ts' Opp'n to Pet's Mot. for Release of Papers and to Compel
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2. The Green Protective Order
Prior to Rasul v. Bush, the Government asserted that it could
lawfully hold Guantnamo prisoners incommunicado and with-
out access to counsel. 79 Following the Supreme Court's decision
in Rasul, the D.C. Circuit remanded that case back to the district
court for further proceedings in accordance with the Supreme
Court's ruling.8 ° At that point, the Government drafted a set of
proposed procedures governing counsel access to Guantdnamo
prisoners and classified information.8 The proposed rules,
which would have permitted counsel to meet with prisoners only
under Government surveillance, were opposed by prisoners'
counsel.8 2 After multiple hearings and extensive negotiation in
two district courts over several months, a version of the Govern-
ment's Proposed Protective Order was ruled upon by U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly in Al-Odah v. Bush, and subse-
quently implemented as a protective order issued by U.S. District
Judge Joyce Hens Green on November 8, 2004.83 This version of
the protective order would eventually be implemented in the
majority of Guantdnamo prisoner cases.8 4
Disc., Paracha v. Bush, No. 04-cv-2022 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2005) (opposing request for
documents and information); see also MARGULIES, supra note 1, at 25-28 (discussing De-
fense Department resistance to attorney-client meetings at Guant~namo and reluctance
to provide information about clients).
79. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471-72 (2004) (describing procedural history of
case); see also Adem v. Bush, 425 F. Supp. 2d 7, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2006) (narrating history
of Guant~namo prisoners' access to counsel).
80. See Al Odah v. United States, 103 Fed. Appx. 676, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (re-
manding consolidated cases to district court for further proceedings in accordance with
Rasul decision); Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (narrating post-Rasul proceedings culmi-
nating in Green Protective Order).
81. See Rasul v. Bush, No. 02-299 (D.D.C. July 26, 2004) (dkt. No. 51) (instructing
parties to file joint status report and briefing schedule regarding proposed procedures
for prisoners' access to counsel); see also Al Odah v. United States, No. 02-828 (D.D.C.
July 23, 2004) (dkt. 38) (setting briefing schedule on issue of proposed procedures for
prisoners' access to counsel); Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (narrating post-Rasul pro-
ceedings culminating in Green Protective Order).
82. See A] Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting
opposition to Government's proposed procedures for counsel access); see also Adem, 425
F. Supp. 2d at 11-12 (noting opposition to Government's proposed procedures).
83. See Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 5-14 (ruling on merits of protective order sub-
mitted by Government); see also In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174,
175 (D.D.C. 2004) (implementing protective order); Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (nar-
rating chronology of proceedings culminating in implementation of Green Protective
Order).
84. See Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (observing that Green Protective order has
been entered in "vast majority" of Guantanamo habeas cases); Qasim v. Bush, No. 05-cv-
892 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:873
Entitled "Amended Protective Order and Procedures for
Counsel Access to Detainees at the United States Naval Base in
Guantnamo Bay, Cuba," Judge Green's order implemented a
set of procedures, the "Revised Procedures for Counsel Access to
Prisoners at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba,"
(the "Revised Procedures") created by the Department of De-
fense and submitted with the Government's motion for a protec-
tive order.8 5 These procedures govern the extent to which coun-
sel for Guantdnamo prisoners could access and disclose certain
information that the Government deems related to national se-
curity, or otherwise protected. 6 Among these procedures are
rules governing access to clients themselves, 7 the logistics of
counsel visits, and correspondence between counsel and pris-
oner.
8 8
1179, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2006) (implementing protective order and noting its use
in majority of Guantanamo habeas corpus cases); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (report-
ing protective order used in more than 200 cases).
85. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 183-92 (implement-
ing "Revised Procedures for Counsel Access to Prisoners at the U.S. Naval Base in Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba"); see also Adem, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (noting implementation of
procedures). This set of procedures slightly modified an earlier set of procedures, the
"Procedures for Counsel Access to Prisoners at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba" (the "Procedures"), that had been submitted to the court in a different prisoner
case. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 176 (implementing
procedures); see also Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 4 (noting, in ruling prior to Green
Protective Order, existence of several proposed procedures for counsel access).
86. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 175 (stating purpose
as "to prevent the unauthorized disclosure or dissemination of classified national secur-
ity information and other protected information that may be reviewed by, made availa-
ble to, or are otherwise in the possession of, the petitioners and/or petitioners' counsel
in these coordinated cases"); Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (noting purpose of order as to
govern the procedures by which counsel for Guantanamo detainees may meet and com-
municate with their clients). The order amended slightly a substantively identical pro-
tective order issued by Judge Green three days previous, which had governed the Guan-
t~namo cases that had been consolidated before Judge Green. The Green Protective
Order was subsequently modified slightly, to clarify filing procedures. See Al Odah v.
United States, 02-cv-828 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2004) (dkt. 144) (amending original order);
Al Odah v. United States, 02-cv-828 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2004) (dkt. 167) (amending origi-
nal order); Adem v. Bush, No. 05-cv-723, 2006 WL 1193853, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 28,
2006) (mentioning amendments made to Green Protective Order on November 10,
2004 and December 13, 2004).
87. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 184-86 (describing
requirements for access to and communication with clients); see also Hafetz, supra note
65, at 147-48 (mentioning rules for counsel access and communications).
88. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 185-91 (establishing
rules for logistics of counsel visits and attorney-client correspondence); see also Hafetz,
supra note 65, at 148-50 (noting restrictions for counsel visits and correspondence put
in place by Green Protective Order).
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In some ways, the Green Protective Order appears similar to
the protective orders issued in the Hanssen and Lindh cases. It
requires counsel for Guantinamo prisoners to possess a security
clearance, to affirm their understanding of the security proce-
dures, and to access classified information only at a secure facil-
ity.8 Likewise, the Green Protective Order requires counsel to
submit filings through a Court Security Officer charged with de-
termining whether filings are to be made public, or are to be
filed with the Court under seal.90 There are, however, several
aspects of the Green Protective Order that are different from the
earlier orders. The most significant of these are as follows.
The Green Protective Order provides rules requiring coun-
sel to verify that they represent their client at Guantinamo.9'
The Order states that this verification should include evidence
that counsel has the "authority" to represent the prisoner at
Guantdnamo."2 It specifies that this evidence should be pro-
vided within ten days after the second visit to the prisoner at
Guantinamo.93 As part of this verification, the Order also re-
quires that counsel affirm that they are not funded directly or
indirectly by persons connected with terrorism.94
Unlike the orders in Hanssen and Lindh, the Green Protec-
tive Order further specifies procedures for the logistics of coun-
89. Compare In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 178-79, 191-92
(stating rules for security clearance, memorandum of understanding, and use of secure
facility to access information), with supra notes 50, 56 and accompanying text (stating
rules in Hanssen and Lindh protective orders).
90. Compare In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 178-79, 191-92
(stating procedures for filing and declassification), with supra notes 50, 56 and accom-
panying text (stating rules in Hanssen and Lindh protective orders).
91. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (requiring coun-
sel to verify their representation of prisoners as specified); see also H. Candace Gorman,
Inside America's Gulag: A Guantdntanamo Lawyer Reports from a Parallel Legal Universe, IN
THESE TImEs, Feb. 13, 2007, available at http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3023/
inside-americas-gulag/ (commenting on "daunting series of bureaucratic hurdles" im-
posed by Green Protective Order).
92. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (requiring coun-
sel to present "evidence of his or her authority" to represent client at Guantnamo); see
also Gorman, supra note 91 (describing clearance process required before client visita-
tion).
93. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (specifying time
limit for presenting verification of representation); see also Gorman, supra note 91
(describing clearance process).
94. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (requiring signed
representation that counsel is not recipient of terrorist-related funds).
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sel visits.9" Counsel wishing to meet with their client must sub-
mit a request to the Government to do so, indicating the dates of
availability and the duration of the meeting; the Government is
to take reasonable efforts to accommodate such requests.96
Other logistical details, such as arrangements for travel to the
base and lodging while visiting, are to be coordinated with the
Government.97 In addition to the required security clearance,
counsel must have a country and theater clearance, and con-
firmed flight information for travel to the base, all provided no
later than twenty days prior to the anticipated visit.9"
The Green Protective Order also specifies procedures for
correspondence between counsel and prisoner.99 It establishes a
"privilege team" of Defense Department attorneys to review cor-
respondence being sent from counsel to a prisoner at GuantA-
namo. 100 Correspondence designated "legal mail," defined as le-
gal documents and other letters related to the counsel's repre-
sentation of that prisoner, is inspected by the privilege team "for
prohibited physical contraband" before being sent to the pris-
oner.10' The Green Protective Order provides that materials not
falling within the definition of legal mail, including letters from
family and friends of the prisoner, may be sent to Guantinamo
95. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 185-86 (providing
requirements for logistics of counsel visits); see also Gorman, supra note 91 (describing
intricacies of client visitation).
96. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (specifying pro-
cedure for arranging visit to base to meet with client); see also Gorman, supra note 91
(describing experience of visitation procedure).
97. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (describing re-
quirement that logistical details such as accommodations be arranged in advance); see
also Gorman, supra note 91 (describing meeting client after "eight months of delays and
obstruction").
98. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (requiring all
clearances and travel information confirmed in advance of visit); see also Gorman, supra
note 91 (describing clearance process required before client visitation); see generally
Gorman, supra note 91 (describing Protective Order rules in practice).
99. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 186-88 (specifying
procedures for correspondence between counsel and client); see generally Gorman,
supra note 91 (describing Protective Order rules in practice).
100. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 186-87 (requiring
that written correspondence from attorney to client be first sent to privilege review
team, which in turn should pass authorized materials to clients); see generally Gorman,
supra note 91 (describing Protective Order rules in practice).
101. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (describing mail
inspection procedure); see generally Gorman, supra note 91 (describing Protective Order
rules in practice).
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prisoners only via the U.S. Postal Service, and may not be in-
cluded with legal mail.10 2 Mail sent from the prisoner to counsel
must likewise be designated as "legal" or "non-legal" mail,
though "legal mail" does not pass through the privilege team. 0 3
The Green Protective Order also specifies a similar set of proce-
dures for materials, including the attorney's notes, which are
brought into and out of a meeting between the attorney and his
or her client at Guant~namo.1
0 4
According to the Green Protective Order, any material
learned from a prisoner at Guant~namo is determined to be pre-
sumptively classified, and as such may not be disclosed to any
unauthorized person (including unauthorized members of the
defense) unless and until it has been approved for disclosure by
the privilege team or by the Court itself.1" 5 Thus, all attorney
notes taken in client meetings must be submitted to the privilege
team for classification review.' 0 6 Any materials that are not ap-
proved for disclosure by the privilege team may only be accessed
by counsel at the secure facility in Washington, D.C., and their
content may not be disclosed to any unauthorized persons.0 7
There are several other miscellaneous yet noteworthy as-
pects of the Green Protective Order. Unlike the orders in Han-
ssen and Lindh, the Green Protective Order also specifically re-
stricts telephonic access between prisoners and counsel, stating
102. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 186-87 (describing
alternate procedures for sending non-legal correspondence); seegenerally Gorman, supra
note 91 (describing Protective Order rules in practice).
103. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 187-89 (describing
procedure for mail sent from client to attorney); see generally Gorman, supra note 91
(describing Protective Order rules in practice).
104. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 188-90 (specifying
procedures for processing of materials brought into and out of meetings with clients at
Guant~namo); see generally Gorman, supra note 91 (describing Protective Order rules in
practice).
105. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (stating that
counsel is required to treat all information learned from client as classified until sub-
mitted to the privilege team and deemed to be otherwise); see also Gorman, supra note
91 (describing Protective Order rules in practice).
106. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (specifically
indicating that attorney notes must be submitted to privilege team for possible declas-
sification before being disseminated); see also Gorman, supra note 91 (describing Pro-
tective Order rules in practice).
107. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (requiring all
documents potentially containing classified information to remain in secure facility un-
til declassified); see also Gorman, supra note 91 (describing Protective Order rules in
practice).
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that requests for such access will generally not be permitted but
may be considered on a case-by-case basis.1t 8 The Order also for-
bids counsel from using cameras, laptops, cell phones, or other
recording devices at Guant~namo, and permits GuantAnamo se-
curity personnel to search lawyers themselves if the base authori-
ties consider it necessary.1" 9 Among other unconventional re-
strictions is a requirement that all documents containing classi-
fied information-presumably those in the possession of the
defense as well as the Government-shall be destroyed by the
Court Security Officer at the conclusion of the cases.110
Thus, the Green Protective Order is considerably different
from the types of orders employed in Hanssen and Lindh, two
cases which also involved national security concerns."t ' As the
Green Protective Order's rules about counsel access and com-
munication indicate, the Green Protective Order does more
than limit counsel's access to and use of information: it actually
limits the extent, nature, and timing of attorney-client con-
tact.
1 12
II: THE DEBATE OVER THE GREEN PROTECTIVE ORDER AND
THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED
PROTECTIVE ORDER
There is considerable debate about the appropriateness of
the Green Protective Order. This debate is most vigorously
presented in the arguments submitted by the parties in the
pending cases Bismullah v. Rumsfeld and Parhat v. Gates, brought
pursuant to the DTA."' In these cases, the question of the
108. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (providing rules
limiting telephone access); see generally Gorman, supra note 91 (describing Protective
Order rules in practice).
109. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (describing
general Guant~namo security procedures); see generally Gorman, supra note 91 (describ-
ing Protective Order rules in practice).
110. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 180-81 (requiring
document destruction at conclusion of case).
111. Compare supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (describing similarities of
orders), with supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text (describing features unique to
Green Protective Order).
112. See supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text (describing various ways in
which Green Protective Order limits attorney-client contact).
113. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14 (petitioning for protective
order more restrictive than Green Protective Order); Bismullah Opp'n. to Proposed
Protective Order, supra note 11 (opposing Government's motion to implement protec-
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whether the Green Protective Order should be put in place is
currently being litigated."l 4 The Government's position, as ar-
ticulated in arguments made to the Bismullah and Parhat Courts,
is essentially that the Green Protective Order has inadequately
limited the flow of information into and out of Guant~namo,
and that national security concerns warrant the implementation
of a more restrictive protective order, particularly in cases
brought directly to the D.C. Circuit, pursuant to the DTA.1" 5 In
opposition to this position, prisoners Bismullah and Parhat ar-
gue that the Green Protective Order has been generally appro-
priate and should continue to be implemented by courts hearing
prisoners' cases, including suits brought pursuant to the DTA.116
This Part examines these two competing claims about the Green
Protective Order's appropriateness. It also examines a relevant
third position, not arising in the Bismullah and Parhat cases, but
articulated in Paracha v. Gates, a habeas corpus case, which main-
tains that the Green Protective Order is flawed because it is too
restrictive.li1
tive order more restrictive than Green Protective Order); Parhat Opp'n to Proposed
Protective Order, supra note 10 (arguing for appropriateness of Green Protective Or-
der); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (reporting on Government's motion for protective
order in Bismullah case).
114. See Dreiling, supra note 5 (reporting on current litigation of Green Protective
Order); see also Hafetz, supra note 65, at 149-50 (noting current dispute over scope of
counsel access at Guantnamo).
115. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14 at 4-20 (arguing for stricter
protective order; citing "disputes over how provisions work, unanticipated conse-
quences, and unworkable or unwise provisions"); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (report-
ing on Government's argument).
116. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 2-9
(summarizing argument opposing more restrictive protective order and requesting
Green Protective Order be implemented instead; claiming that Proposed Protective Or-
der "specifically interferes" with scope of discovery and attorney-client relationship);
Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 8-14 (arguing that Gov-
ernment has used protective order as excuse to withhold basic information about pris-
oners' detention; urging implementation of Green Protective Order); see also Dreiling,
supra note 5 (reporting Bismullah's opposition to Government motion for protective
order).
117. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 19-31 (listing seven particular
objections to the restrictions imposed by the Green Protective Order, including its re-
quirement of security clearance for defense counsel, executive branch inquiry into the
source of fees, discouraging of telephone access to prisoners, restrictions on what coun-
sel may tell a prisoner, restrictions on what a prisoner may tell counsel, or on what
counsel may do with information learned from the prisoner, abrogation of attorney-
client confidentiality and failure to screen off or isolate the privilege teams, and re-
quirement that records be destroyed).
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A. The Government's Position: The Green Protective Order Is
Not Restrictive Enough
To the Government, the underlying purpose of a protective
order for counsel access to prisoners at Guantdnamo is to pre-
vent the unauthorized disclosure or dissemination of classified
national security information and other protected information
available to petitioners and petitioner's counsel, in the interests
of national security."' a To this end, a protective order should
establish procedures by which petitioners and their counsel, as
well as other individuals, may receive access to classified or pro-
tected information or documents under specified circum-
stances.' 1 9
As discussed above, the Green Protective Order sets certain
limitations on the actions an attorney may take in handling in-
formation from a client in connection with the representation of
a prisoner held at Guantdnamo.120 The Government's position,
as articulated by counsel in the pending Bismullah case, is that
these limitations do not go far enough; they do not provide an
adequate level of control over attorney-client visitation. 12 1 Invok-
ing their experience operating under the Green Protective Or-
der, the Government has named a variety of concerns. 22 In ad-
dition, the Government has asked the D.C. Circuit to adopt, in
cases brought under the DTA, an alternative protective order
(the "Proposed Protective Order") that is considerably stricter
118. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at addendum B, 1 (describ-
ing purpose of protective order as protecting national security); see also Dreiling, supra
note 5 (reporting Government's argument for protective order).
119. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that Govern-
ment cannot properly facilitate counsel access and visits in DTA cases absent protective
measures implemented through the Proposed Protective Order); see also Dreiling, supra
note 5 (reporting Government's Proposed Protective Order establishing procedures for
counsel access).
120. See supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text (describing restrictions im-
posed by Green Protective Order).
121. Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 1-2 (stating that limitations
do not "adequately address the unique security needs presented by visiting a secure
military base and communicating with an alien detained by the military as an enemy
combatant during a time of war"); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (reporting Govern-
ment's position).
122. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 6-12 (describing con-
cerns including alleged problems with legal mail system, lawyer visitation, procedures to
govern initiation of suit by detainee, definition of "need-to-know" information, and
other issues); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (quoting Government as saying greater
restrictions are needed because of experience with district court order).
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than the Green Protective Order. 2 3 The Government's con-
cerns, and the remedies it asks the court to adopt in the Pro-
posed Protective Order, are summarized as follows.
1. Concerns about Communication with Prisoners
a. General Communication Between Clients and the
Outside World
A substantial portion of the Green Protective Order per-
tains to communication between attorneys and their clients at
Guantdnamo, limiting the information that counsel may com-
municate to their clients or share with other people.' 24  The
Government asserts that the Green Protective Order is inade-
quate because, in spite of the order being in place, counsel have
provided information to prisoners about events outside of Guan-
tnamo, and communicated to others purportedly sensitive in-
formation obtained in the course of their representation.' 25 As
evidence for this assertion, the Government alleges various in-
stances in which attorney-client communication governed by the
Green Protective Order resulted in information improperly en-
tering or leaving the base.126 It mentions, for example, an inci-
dent in which a prisoner was overheard saying that his habeas
attorney had told him about "acts of war and terrorism" in Israel,
123. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. B, 1-55 (providing
sample protective order more restrictive than Green Protective Order, to be applied in
cases brought pursuant to the DTA); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (summarizing Gov-
ernment's Proposed Protective Order as seeking to (a) limit counsel to four visits with
the client over the course of the entire litigation; (b) prevent lawyers from discussing
topics the government designates as "protected"; (c) limit correspondence from attor-
neys and allow attorneys access only to the record considered by panel making "enemy
combatant" determination"; and (d) give the government the right to unilaterally ter-
minate visits and access to classified information).
124. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text (describing restrictions on
communication with prisoners under Green Protective Order).
125. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 6-7 (claiming that legal
mail and lawyer visit system governed by the Green Protective Order has been used to
provide information to prisoners, presenting "security issues" at the base and going
beyond the "legitimate purposes for which counsel access is provided"); see also Dreil-
ing, supra note 5 (noting Government's assertions).
126. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 6-7 (referencing at-
tached Declaration of Commander Patrick M. McCarthy, which states that prisoners
have been informed of terrorist attacks in Iraq, London and Israel, and claims that
prisoner was provided with book including information about abuse at Abu Ghraib
prison, among other assertions); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting assertions made
in Government's submissions).
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Iraq, Syria, and London. 12 7 The Government also alleges an in-
stance in which photographs of Guant~namo visitor access
badges were posted on the website of a New York radio station,
requiring that the base security manager change the badges
given to base visitors.1 28 The Government's papers also describe
an instance in which an attorney allegedly took questions from a
journalist with him to a client meeting on base, and provided the
reporter with the prisoner's answers afterward. 129 It also asserts,
in general terms, the existence of other instances in which com-
munication between attorneys and prisoners under the Green
Protective Order has caused problems at the base. 3 ° These
events have apparently not been reported outside of the Govern-
ment's court documents. In addition, there is evidence that
Guantdinamo prisoners have learned information about the
outside world from their captors.
1 31
The Government's Proposed Protective Order purports to
address these concerns by imposing a significantly broader defi-
127. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. A, 3, 5 (stating that
a prisoner was overheard in conversation with another prisoner, reporting that his
habeas attorney told him about various acts of war and terrorism in Iraq, as well as
information about London bombing and violence in Syria and Iraq; stating that, after
meeting with attorney, prisoner was overheard discussing recent developments in con-
flict between Hezbollah and Israel); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting assertions
made in Government's submissions).
128. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 7 (claiming that security
was breached by photographing of access badges worn by Guantinamo military staff;
claiming photographs were posted on the Internet); Gov't Mot. for Protective Order,
supra note 86, at add. A, 4 (asserting that attorneys posted pictures of their access
badges and picture of a U.S. Coast Guard port security boat on website of New York
commercial radio station); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting assertions made in
Government's submissions).
129. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. A, 4-5 (asserting
that an article on the British Broadcasting Corporation ("BBC") news website posted an
article using information provided by a prisoner at Guantinamo; asserting prisoner's
attorney took questions from BBC reporter with him to meeting with prisoner); see also
Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting assertions made in Government's submissions).
130. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 6 (asserting "numerous
other instances" of passing "improper information" to prisoners); see also Gov't Mot. for
Protective Order, supra note 14 add. A, at 5 (stating that cited examples are only "sam-
pling of the problems" experienced under Protective Order).
131. See, e.g., Heike Westendorf, The World Cup Gitmo-Style, SPIEGEL ONLINE, June
29, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0, 1518,424304,00.html (last visited Feb.
10, 2007) (reporting that some prisoners were permitted to watch World Cup soccer
games, perhaps as "propaganda war"); see also Rob Taylor, Guantanamo Inmates Shown
Saddam Hanging Photos: Lawyer, ABC NEWS.coM, Feb. 10, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/
International/wireStory?id=2840208 (last visited Feb 10, 2007) (reporting incident in
which prisoners were shown photo of execution of Saddam Hussein).
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nition of "protected material," that would further restrict coun-
sel's handling and dissemination of information from prison-
ers.' 32 The Green Protective Order defines "protected informa-
tion" as "any document or information deemed by the Court,
either upon application by counsel or sua sponte, as worthy of
special treatment as if the document or information were classi-
fied, even if the document or information has not been formally
deemed to be classified. '1 3 3 The Government's Proposed Pro-
tective Order, by contrast, would allow the Government, not the
Court, to classify any information as protected information, and
would narrow the circumstances under which counsel may share
protected information with his client.1 3 1
b. Legal Mail System
The Government further argues that the Green Protective
Order's procedure for communicating with prisoners via legal
mail does not provide close enough oversight of attorney-client
communication between prisoners and their counsel.13 5 The
Government claims that, pursuant to the Green Protective Or-
der, legal mail may be reviewed for physical contraband, but not
132. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. B, 10, 19-20 (grant-
ing Department of Defense privilege team specific authority to identify and designate
information "Protected Information"; forbidding disclosure or distribution of protected
information except to (a) other security-cleared counsel representing the same pris-
oner who have agreed to be bound by the protective order; and (b) the Court and its
support personnel); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting that Proposed Protective
Order would prevent lawyers from discussing topics government designates as "pro-
tected").
133. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 177 (D.D.C.
2004) (defining "protected information"); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (reporting that
Proposed Protective Order would limit access to "protected" information).
134. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. B, 21 ('providing
that counsel shall not disclose protected information to petitioner, unless that informa-
tion was obtained from the petitioner, unless counsel obtains permission of Govern-
ment counsel or Court); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting that Proposed Protective
Order would prevent lawyers from discussing topics the government designates as "pro-
tected").
135. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 6 (asserting that legal
mail and lawyer visit system has been used to provide information to prisoners, present-
ing "security issues" at base); see also Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at
add. A, 2 (asserting that problems are result of legal mail being reviewed only for "phys-
ical contraband" and not "content contraband," resulting in non-legal documents and
information being delivered through legal mail system). It should be noted that the
phrase "content contraband" is apparently a neologism in the lexicon of the federal
courts, as a Westiaw search by the author of all federal cases revealed no prior use of
this phrase.
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for "content contraband."' 36 As a result, the Government al-
leges, "non-legal documents" were sent into and out of Guantd-
namo though the legal mail system. 137
In support of this assertion, the Government alleges in-
stances in which material that officials consider to be "content
contraband" has been received by prisoners through the legal
mail system governed by the Green Protective Order. 131 One in-
stance involved a prisoner possessing a book about torture at
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, which had apparently been sent to
the prisoner through the legal mail system. 139  The Govern-
ment's primary problem with the book was that it contained in-
formation related to investigations of military operations in Iraq
which, they say, could "incite prisoners to violence" or lead to
"destabilization of the camp." 140 Another instance involved an
attorney who sent his client, through the legal mail system, a
copy of a speech given at an Amnesty International confer-
ence. 141 The Government claimed that the speech contained in-
formation regarding current political events in Iraq and else-
where; again, the Government's concern was that such content
could threaten the security of the camp by inciting violence. 42
136. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, add. A at 2 (noting legal
mail was reviewed only for "physical contraband" and not "content contraband").
137. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. A, 2-3 (claiming
"non-legal" documents including a book about Abu Ghraib were labeled "legal mail"
and received by prisoners through the legal mail system Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting
that Proposed Protective Order would prevent lawyers from discussing topics the gov-
ernment designates as "protected").
138. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. A, 2-3 (asserting
presence of "content contraband").
139. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 113, at 6 (asserting that book
containing information about abuse at Abu Ghraib prison was provided to prisoner);
Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. A, 2-3 (characterizing book
about Abu Ghraib torture and military operations of United States in Iraq as "content
contraband").
140. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 7 (asserting that book
about investigations of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison constitutes a "serious threat" to se-
curity of the prison); Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. A, 3
(claiming "content contraband" could incite prisoners to violence, leading to
"destabilization" of prison).
141. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. A, 3 (claiming that
attorney gave client a copy of Amnesty International speech containing "inflammatory
information regarding current political events" without sending it through the non-
legal mail review processes).
142. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 6 (asserting that infor-
mation allegedly passed from counsel to prisoners "presents a serious threat to the se-
curity of the camp"); Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 86, add. A, at 3 (stat-
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In another alleged instance, the Government claimed that biog-
raphies and photos of Guantinamo prisoners were sent to other
prisoners through the legal mail system.' 43 The Government as-
serted that these incidents are representative of many problems
arising from the legal mail system.144 Again, these events do not
seem to have been reported outside of the Government's court
submissions.
The Government's Proposed Protective Order would dra-
matically narrow the definition of "legal mail" and explicitly for-
bid counsel providing certain materials-some of which are rou-
tinely given to prisoners by their counsel under the Green Pro-
tective Order-in correspondence labeled legal mail.'45
Whereas the Green Protective Order defined legal mail as letters
written between counsel and a prisoner that are related to the
counsel's representation of the prisoner, as well as privileged
documents and publicly-filed legal documents relating to that
ing that "inflammatory information regarding current political events" that "threatens
the security of the camp, as it could incite violence among the detainees").
143. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 113, at add. A, 4 (asserting
that group of prisoners, some co-clients of same law firm, possesed documents contain-
ing biographies and photos of various detainees, and news articles about relating to
Guantdnamo Bay, none of which submitted through non-legal mail process).
144. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 6 (asserting "numerous
other instances" of passing improper information to and from detainees); Gov't Mot.
for'Trotective Order, supra note 14, add. A, at 5 (characterizing examples as "only a
sampling" of the problems encountered under Green Protective Order).
145. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 7 (asserting need to
clarify and limit the scope of what is deemed legal mail; asserting need for privilege
review team to prevent inappropriate material or information from being communi-
cated to prisoners); see also Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. B, 7-9
(defining legal mail) According to the Government, legal mail is limited to:
[D]ocuments and drafts of documents that are intended for filing in this ac-
tion and correspondence directly related to those documents that are directly
related to the litigation of this Detainee Treatment Act action ... address only
(a) those events leading up to this detainee's capture or (b) the conduct of
the CSRT proceeding relating to this detainee; and do not include any of the
following information, in any form: (a) information relating to any ongoing or
completed military, intelligence, security, or law enforcement operations, in-
vestigations, or arrests, or the results of such activities, by any nation or agency;
(b) information relating to current political events in any country; (c) infor-
mation relating to security procedures at the Guantanamo Naval Base
(GTMO) (including names of U.S. Government personnel and the layout of
camp facilities) or the status of other detainees; (d) publications, articles, re-
ports, or other such material including newspaper or other media articles,
pamphlets, brochures, and publications by non-governmental or advocacy or-
ganizations, or any descriptions of such material). Id.
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representation, "6 the Government's Proposed Protective Order
would limit the definition to only documents and drafts of docu-
ments that are intended for filing in this action and correspon-
dence directly related to those documents that is related to the
litigation of a DTA action, and address only events leading up to
the prisoner's capture and/or the conduct of his CSRT proceed-
ing. 4 7 Information relating to ongoing or completed military,
intelligence, security, or law enforcement operations, investiga-
tions, or arrests, or the results of such activities, by any nation or
agency, would also be explicitly forbidden, even where directly
pertinent to a client's case. 4 ' So, too, would the Proposed Pro-
tective Order forbid counsel from communicating with a pris-
oner via legal mail about information relating to current politi-
cal events in any country, providing information dealing with se-
curity procedures at Guantdnamo, or addressing the status of
other prisoners.1 49 It would also be explicitly forbidden to send
one's client, via legal mail, any publications, articles, reports, or
other such material including newspaper or other media arti-
cles, pamphlets, brochures, and publications by non-governmen-
tal or advocacy organizations, or any descriptions of such mate-
rial. 50
Whereas, under the Green Protective Order, legal mail is
inspected by security officers only for "physical contraband, " "'
under the Government's proposed procedures, the privilege re-
view team would be given specific authority to examine legal
mail for "content contraband," including the material noted
above. 52 Though this privilege review team would generally not
146. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 184 (defining "legal
mail").
147. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting Government's proposed
definition of permissible legal mail).
148. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (listing materials falling outside
Government's proposed definition of permissible legal mail).
149. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (listing materials falling outside
Government's proposed definition of permissible legal mail).
150. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (listing materials falling outside
Government's proposed definition of permissible legal mail).
151. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 186 (D.D.C.
2004) (stating that upon receiving legal mail from counsel for delivery to the prisoner,
privilege team shall open materials to search the contents for prohibited physical con-
traband, forwarding materials to base military personnel for delivery within two days if
approved).
152. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 7 (noting that legal mail
regime under Proposed Protective Order would have a privilege review team that would
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be permitted to share information learned by reading prisoners'
legal mail with the Government, it would be permitted to do so
in limited circumstances where communications relate to immi-
nent acts of violence or could harm the national security.15
Under the Proposed Protective Order, counsel violating the le-
gal mail rules could be barred access to the base and the legal
mail system,154 and the Government may take such actions with-
out consulting the Court or counsel.155
2. Concerns about Verifying Representation
The Green Protective Order provides rules for counsel that,
in representing prisoners with pending habeas corpus petitions
filed on their behalf by a "next friend," visit the base to secure
direct authorization of representation by their clients.'56 Ac-
cording to the Government, which has long opposed and repeat-
edly challenged the legitimacy of petitions brought on "next
friend" standing,' 57 this aspect of the Green Protective Order is
review all written communications to and from prisoners); Gov't Mot. for Protective
Order, supra note 14, at add. B, 9-10 (authorizing privilege team to review written com-
munications and all other materials sent between counsel and prisoner).
153. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 7 (asserting that privi-
lege team cannot share information with Government except in carefully limited cir-
cumstances where communications "relate to imminent acts of violence or could harm
the national security"); see also Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. B,
9-11 (stating that privilege team may not disclose communications reviewed, except to
Department of Defense Special Litigation Team, to which it may disclose certain other-
wise privileged information).
154. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. B, 19, 26-28 (pro-
viding that failure to comply with Proposed Protective Order rules may result in the
revocation of counsel's security clearance, revocation of authorization to travel to Guan-
tanamo and possible civil and/or criminal liability).
155. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. B, 27 (reserving
right of Government to "unilaterally take protective measures" without consent of op-
posing counsel if it concludes that any provision of protective order has been violated
or in the event of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information).
156. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 185 (D.D.C.
2004) (requiring that counsel provide evidence of authority to represent client as soon
as practicable, no later than ten days after the conclusion of second visit with client); see
also Adem v. Bush, 425 F. Supp. 2d 7, 10-14 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting Green Protective
Order's relevance to disputes over habeas corpus suits brought by "next friends").
157. See Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 10-14 (noting history of disputes between counsel
and Government over nature and extent of "next friend" standing in habeas corpus
cases brought by prisoners); see also id. at n.14 (listing several habeas corpus cases
brought by Guanttnamo prisoners, in which Government had contested "next friend"
standing).
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unacceptable.15 The Government has not, however, offered fac-
tual examples of any instances in which counsel visiting to secure
authorization of representation have posed a specific prob-
lem.159
Under the Green Protective Order, counsel representing a
prisoner whose petition has been brought by a "next friend" are
permitted two visits with their client to secure direct authoriza-
tion, which need not be in writing. 6 Under the Government's
Proposed Protective Order, such counsel would be limited to
only one visit, for the sole purpose of obtaining authorization,
and they must obtain authorization in writing, on a form pro-
vided by the Government and signed by the prisoner.1 61
3. Concerns about Counsel Access to Confidential and/or
Protected Information
The Green Protective Order establishes procedures pursu-
ant to which civilian attorneys may be permitted access to infor-
mation that the Government deems classified or protected.
162
According to the Government, these procedures are not strict
enough.'6 3 Though the Government offers no specific descrip-
158. Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 6 (describing order as "un-
workable or inappropriate in many respects"); see also Dreiling, supra note 5 (reporting
Government's argument).
159. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 8 (asserting that the
Green Protective Order inadequately addresses procedures to govern initiation of a suit
by prisoner and that counsel for "next friends" had sought to visit prisoners and occa-
sionally been refused to be seen by prisoners, but offering no specific examples of
problems with Green Protective Order's "next friend" regime).
160. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (requiring
counsel to provide evidence of authority to represent prisoner as soon as practicable,
no later than ten days after second visit with client); see also Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 10-
14 (parsing "next friend" in GuantAnamo context).
161. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 9 (asserting that, under
Proposed Protective Order, counsel will be permitted to visit clients to ask client to sign
form granting counsel authorization to represent him and access his CSRT records; if
the prisoner does not sign the form, however, no further visits will be afforded, counsel
will not be afforded access to legal mail system, and counsel will not be granted access
to classified CSRT material.; see also Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 86, at
add. B, 30 (providing that filing of "next friend" suit will not by itself entitle counsel to
visit prison or communicate with client as his counsel through the legal mail system;
describing written authorization requirement for representation of prisoner filing a
"next friend" petition).
162. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 181-83 (stating rules
governing access to classified or protected information).
163. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that Govern-
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tion of a situation in which this classification system has posed a
specific problem, its apparent concern with these procedures is
their ambiguity and the opportunities for litigation that ambigu-
ity can create. 1
6 1
The Government's Proposed Protective Order would limit
counsel's access to confidential or protected information and ex-
pand the scope of information that the Government may classify
as confidential or protected. 16 5 In particular, it would limit the
classified information that may be received by a prisoner's attor-
ney in a suit brought pursuant to the DTA to that prisoner's
Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") file-essentially,
the information used by the Government at the prisoner's CSRT
hearing to establish the prisoner's status as an "enemy combat-
ant."166 The Government seeks this rather drastic curtailing of
the information available to counsel by reasoning that, under
the DTA, the D.C. Circuit purportedly only has jurisdiction to
evaluate the decision, made by the CSRT panel, to classify the
prisoner as an "enemy combatant"; to this end, in suits brought
pursuant to the DTA, prisoner's counsel should only have access
to the materials used in making that decision (as opposed to
broader discovery about the circumstances of a prisoner's cap-
ture, interrogation methods, conditions of confinement, excul-
patory evidence, or other information traditionally relevant in
challenging a prisoner's detention).' 6 7 This aspect of the Gov-
ment cannot permit counsel access in DTA cases without protective measures such as
those in Proposed Protective Order); see also Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note
14, add. A, at 4 (stating that process outlined by protective order has been successful in
protecting national security interests while ensuring attorney-client communications,
but that inadequacies in Green Protective Order have threatened "safety and security"
of base).
164. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 6 (stating that the Green
Protective Order has led to disputes over "how provisions work, unanticipated conse-
quences, and unworkable or unwise provisions."); Dreiling, supra note 5 (quoting coun-
sel for prisoners, who characterized Government's motivation as opposition to "effec-
tive and zealous advocacy.").
165. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (describing expanded definition of
"protected information" in Government's Proposed Protective Order).
166. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 12-14 (claiming that
because review under DTA is on record of CSRT, counsel does not have a need to
engage in "factual development or unlimited consultation" with clients); see also Gov't
Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. B, 13-19 (describing procedures for
access to classified information, with access only to CSRT record material that Govern-
ment has determined petitioners' counsel has need to know).
167. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (stating Government's reasoning
2007]
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ernment's Proposed Protective Order is particularly controver-
sial, given that the constitutionality of the DTA and the scope of
its appellate review are in doubt. 6 '
As this Part has shown, the Government has opposed cer-
tain aspects of the Green Protective Order, and in its litigation of
cases brought under the DTA, advocated a Proposed Protective
Order that it argues would remedy the Green Protective Order's
perceived flaws. Finally, however, it should be noted that the
Government's opposition to the Green Protective Order has not
only been articulated in the context of cases brought pursuant to
the DTA. The Government has also elsewhere argued that the
facts specific to a particular class or type of prisoner (as opposed
to the general circumstances of Guant~namo) warrant a protec-
tive order more restrictive than the Green Protective Order. 169
In that case, the prisoner in question, Majid Khan, spent time in
a Central Intelligence Agency secret prison, where he was alleg-
edly subjected to "alternative interrogation methods" before be-
ing transferred to Guantfnamo.170 When Khan moved the dis-
trict court for entry of the Green Protective Order, the Govern-
that limited scope of DTA review warrants a reduced access of counsel to confidential
information in suit filed pursuant to DTA.
168. The constitutionality of the DTA has been questioned, and is currently under
consideration by the D.C. Circuit in the consolidated cases of Al Odah v. United States,
No. 05-cv-5062 (D.C. Cir.) and Boumediene v. Bush, No. 05-cv-5064 (D.C. Cir.). See
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct 2749, at 2765 (2006) (acknowledging
dispute over constitutionality of DTA; finding no need to address DTA constitutionality
in instant case); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L.R.
333, 349-50 (2006) (discussing whether DTA violates Suspension Clause (Art. I, § 9, cl.
2) of U.S. Const.).
169. See Resp'ts' Mem. in Opp'n to Pet'r's Mot. for Emergency Access to Counsel
and Entry of Am. Protective Order, Khan v. Bush, 06-cv-1690, at *14-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 26,
2006) (arguing that Green Protective Order regime is inappropriate given "unique cir-
cumstances of Khan," because of his prior confinement in a "high-value terrorist de-
tainee program."); see also Scott Shane, Detainees'Access to Lawyers is Security Risk, CI.A.
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, at 1 (reporting on Government's request for stricter
protective order in Khan case); Editorial, Top-Secret Torture, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2006
at A26 (calling Government argument "disturbing"; warning that Government's ap-
proach will prevent accountability for administration's treatment of alleged terrorists, as
well as ensure that key parts of military trials are kept from public).
170. See Resp'ts' Mem. in Opp'n to Pet'r's Mot. for Emergency Access to Counsel
and Entry of Am. Protective Order, Khan v. Bush, 06-cv-1690, at *14 (D.D.C. Oct. 26,
2006) (arguing that Khan possesses "important operational information" about "high-
value terrorist program," including knowledge of locations of secret CIA facilities, inter-
rogation method, and other information"); see also Shane, supra note 169, at 1, 29
(quoting habeas counsel suggesting Government seeks to hide torture inflicted on
Khan).
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ment claimed that Khan's knowledge of classified information-
including, the interrogation methods he endured-required a
stricter protective order that would prevent him from revealing
this confidential information even to his lawyer.17' The type of
protective order appropriate for that case, they argued, would
need to be altered to address "the nature of the information
likely to arise in connection with a prisoner such as Khan.' 7 2
B. The Bismullah/Parhat Position: The Green Protective
Order is Adequate
In litigating the question of what protective order should be
put in place in their respective cases, prisoners Bismullah and
Parhat argue that the purpose of a protective order is not merely
to limit the scope of information available to petitioners and
their counsel (the Government's position)17 but rather to
achieve balance between the Government's interest in protect-
ing national security, and the prisoner's interest in protecting
his right to counsel access and to government information.
174
To this end, in their view, a protective order should not only
establish procedures by which petitioners and their counsel may
receive access to classified or protected information, but also es-
tablishes procedures that ensure that the prisoner's access to
counsel and to certain government information is not unfairly
infringed.1 7' The Green Protective Order, Bismullah and Parhat
171. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (describing Government's pos-
sible rationale for a stricter protective order in Khan case).
172. See Resp'ts' Mem. in Opp'n to Pet'r's Mot. for Emergency Access to Counsel
and Entry of Am. Protective Order, 06-cv-1690, at *14 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2006) (arguing
that protective order in Khan case should account for national security concerns and
classification issues "unique to Khan and others like him"); see also Top-Secret Torture,
supra note 169, at A26 (characterizing Government's requested protective order as "ex-
traordinary measure" to ensure Khan's silence).
173. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (describing Government's asser-
tions about purpose of protective order).
174. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 14-15, 19
(arguing that purpose of protective order is to protect national security as well as pro-
tect rights of prisoners); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note
11, at 8-9 (arguing that aspects of protective order are essential to protect "fragile"
attorney-client relationship).
175. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 20
(claiming that Court is required to properly balance the interests of parties while pre-
serving access to relevant discoverable information under conditions that protect
against risk of harm); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note
11, at 8-9 (characterizing purpose of protective order as protecting both "legitimate
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argue, basically achieves this balance and is thus justified in its
status as the model protective order for other Guantinamo pris-
oner cases. i1 6 In its defense of the Green Protective Order, and
opposition to the Government's alternative protective order, Bis-
mullah and Parhat argue as follows. 17 7
1. The Green Protective Order is Appropriate
Whereas the Government asserts that the Green Protective
Order has been inadequate, Bismullah and Parhat argue that
the Green Protective Order has been generally successful.17 8 As
evidence for this position, Bismullah cites a statement by a high-
ranking naval officer at Guantnamo-a statement made in the
Government's own submissions to the court-that characterizes
the existing protective order as effective. 179  Bismullah and
Parhat also cite the lengthy and careful process by which the
Green Protective Order was originally formulated, 18' and the
governmental interests" and "fragile attorney-client relationship" challenged by the
Guantinamo environment).
176. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 19
(claiming that, after two years, district court protective order has proven to be "gener-
ally successful"); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 8-
13 (arguing that Green Protective Order is appropriate).
177. The argument in favor of the Green Protective Order was not the only argu-
ment brought by Bismullah against the Government's Proposed Protective Order. Bis-
mullah also argued, in the alternative, that a court appoint a special master to recom-
mend an appropriate protective order and to resolve any subsequent issues arising from
the protective order. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11,
at 15-18 (arguing for special master to resolve contested issues of client and information
access, as alternative to implementation of Green Protective Order. At the time of writ-
ing, the Court had not yet ruled on the matter, apparently deferring a ruling until the
D.C. Circuit rules on its jurisdiction in Al Odah. See Dreiling, supra note 5 (noting possi-
bility that court will address "jurisdiction-stripping issues" first).
178. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (characterizing Green Protective
Order as generally successful).
179. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 19 (not-
ing that Government's own declarant, Commander McCarthy, has characterized Green
Protective Order as generally successful); see also Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra
note 14, at add. A, 2 (characterizing process outlined by Green Protective Order as
"successful in protecting the legitimate and important national security interests of the
United States while ensuring that attorneys representing detainee are permitted effec-
tive access to their clients" though not without "situations threatening the safety and
security" of prison).
180. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 12 (not-
ing that Green Protective Order was entered following four months of extensive litiga-
tion and negotiation); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note
11, at 8 (describing entry of Green Protective Order after "extensive and close scrutiny
of the issues").
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length of time that the Green Protective Order has been in
use.' Calling attention to the considerable amount of time al-
ready invested by the judiciary in fine-tuning the Green Protec-
tive Order, as well as the multiple parties that have come to be
governed by it, Bismullah and Parhat suggest that other parties
that would be affected should be consulted before any order re-
places the Green Protective Order.
t8 2
2. The Government's Concerns are Unjustified
a. Claims Unspecific and Hearsay
In articulating its concerns about the Green Protective Or-
der, the Government mentions several situations in which, it
claims, the Green Protective Order has failed to prevent infor-
mation flowing into or out of Guantdnamo. l'8 In response to
these allegations, Bismullah and Parhat argue that the descrip-
tions of these situations are unreliable, as they are based on vari-
ous levels of hearsay, from unnamed and perhaps unreliable
sources."8 4 Bismullah and Parhat also point out that none of the
supposed violations of the Green Protective Order involved
them or their counsel, and that there is no evidence that they
have ever violated the Green Protective Order or done anything
to justify a more restrictive protective order."8 "
181. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 19 (not-
ing two years of experience during which Green Protective Order has proven to be
"generally successful"); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note
11, at 8-9 (observing lack of allegations of violations of the of Green Protective Order).
182. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 19 (argu-
ing that, if many DTA cases are to follow, courts would benefit of hearing from other
counsel, including those who participated in litigation and negotiation of Green Protec-
tive Order); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 12-13
(stating that, before modifying Green Protective Order regime, Court should hear from
all interested parties, including Bismullah and any other DTA petitioners).
183. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text (describing Government con-
cerns about information entering and leaving Guant~namo).
184. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 20-21
(arguing that declaration included with Government's motion for protective order does
not assert enough facts, and may constitute "unreliable hearsay," from unidentified
sources; noting that six of the seven alleged problems occurred before Commander
McCarthy, the Government's declarant, arrived at Guant~namo); see also Parhat Opp'n
to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 9 (arguing that Government's Proposed
Protective Order is intended to "scuttle effective review").
185. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 19 (argu-
ing that Government has failed to show adequate cause for Proposed Protective Order,
which at time of writing would apply only to Bismullah's case); see also Parhat Opp'n to
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b. Claims Not Asserted Before District Court
In addition, the parties opposing the Government's allega-
tions argue that the Government has not sought modifications to
the Green Protective Order in pending district court cases; how-
ever great the problems with the Green Protective Order may
be, the Government has generally not tried to remedy them
before district court judges. 186 This fact, Bismullah and Parhat
argue, strongly suggests that the Government's pursuit of a new
protective order may be motivated by concerns other than the
supposed failure of the Green Protective Order.1
8 7
3. The Government's Proposed Protective Order is
Overly Restrictive
Bismullah and Parhat are strongly critical of the Govern-
ment's Proposed Protective Order, which they consider overly
restrictive, unnecessary, and crafted to serve fundamentally dif-
ferent ends than the Green Protective Order. 188 Whereas the
Green Protective Order was designed to balance the interests of
the parties, they claim, the Government's Proposed Protective
Order is designed specifically to limit with the scope of discovery
and interfere with the attorney-client relationship between pris-
oners and counsel.1 89 The net result, they argue, will be a stran-
gling of the prisoners' rights to seek judicial review of their de-
Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 9 (disputing Government allegations that
Green Protective Order has been "misused").
186. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 20 (argu-
ing that Government submits no evidence that Respondent has sought to effect similar
modification to Green Protective Order); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective
Order, supra note 10, at 9 (arguing that Government never alleged violations of, or
previously sought to amend, protective order).
187. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 19
(claiming that Government decision to request more restrictive protective order "seems
guided more by litigation tactics than national security concerns"); see also Parhat
Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 10, at 9 (describing Government's
argument for new protective order as "merely tactical").
188. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 19 (argu-
ing that purpose of protective order is to protect national security as well as protect
"legitimate rights and needs" of prisoners); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective
Order, supra note 11, at 8-9 (characterizing purpose of protective order as protecting
both governmental interests and "fragile" attorney-client relationship).
189. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 3-4 (ar-
guing that Proposed Protective Order interferes with the scope of discovery attorney-
client relationship, which will make it difficult, hindering client's ability to seek judicial
review of his detention); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note
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tention.1l 0 Bismullah and Parhat voice several complaints about
the Government's Proposed Protective Order.
a. Limitations on Discovery
According to Bismullah and Parhat, the Government's Pro-
posed Protective Order would greatly limit the scope of discov-
ery.'9 In particular, it would limit the material that counsel may
access on behalf of a prisoner to that prisoner's classified CSRT
record; it would apparently not permit access to other informa-
tion-classified or unclassified-relevant to the CSRT process
and determination that a prisoner is an "enemy combatant."112
In addition, according to the parties opposing the Proposed Pro-
tective Order, the order would further limit the scope of discov-
ery in "next friend" cases.19 Counsel representing a prisoner
pursuant to a "next friend" request would not be permitted ac-
cess to classified CSRT records.194 The net result, Bismullah and
Parhat argue, would be the impairment of the prisoner's right,
upheld in Rasul v. Bush, to challenge the basis of indefinite de-
l1, at 8-10 (arguing that Government's intention is to "scuttle effective review," limit
counsel visits, and curtail litigation brought on "next friend" standing).
190. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 4 (argu-
ing that Proposed Protective Order will obstruct effective judicial review); see also Parhat
Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 8-10 (arguing that Government's
intention is to limit access to courts and attorneys).
191. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 3-4 (ar-
guing that Proposed Protective Order interferes with scope of discovery); see also Parhat
Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 8 (characterizing Government's
requested "need-to-know" rules as obstructing access to classified material).
192. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 4-5 (ar-
guing that Proposed Protective Order would cut short fact-finding process by "abso-
lutely foreclos[ing] Bismullah's counsel from seeking any other information, no matter
how relevant or critical to Bismullah's claim, including information that is neither clas-
sified nor sensitive"); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11,
at 8 (criticizing Government's unwillingness to provide counsel even the CSRT record).
193. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 6-7 (ar-
guing that Proposed Protective Order incorporates rule rejected by the district courts
and requires that next friend cases be converted to direct cases in order to meaning-
fully prosecute the case); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra
note 11, at 10 (arguing that Proposed Protective Order would avoid a series of closely-
reasoned next friend decisions including Adem, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 9-14).
194. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 4 (ob-
serving that, under Proposed Protective Order, counsel who fail to get direct authoriza-
tion from prisoner will be denied visitation, access to legal mail, and classified material
in CSRT record); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at
10 (arguing that Government's intention is to curtail litigation brought on "next
friend" standing).
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tention in federal court.'9 5
b. Interference with Attorney-Client Relationship
According to Bismullah and Parhat, the Government's Pro-
posed Protective Order would radically interfere with the attor-
ney-client relationship between prisoners and counsel, a rela-
tionship that is already considerably strained by an environment
cultivated to psychologically destabilize prisoners and eliminate
their confidence in the legal system, as well as by judicial inac-
tion and certain cultural factors.1 96 Under the Proposed Protec-
tive Order, counsel would be limited to only three visits with
their clients, after an initial meeting to establish authorization of
representation; counsel representing prisoners with "next
friend" petitions would be allowed to visit clients only at the Gov-
ernment's discretion, only to procure written authorization of
representation and nothing more. 97
195. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 4 (assert-
ing that Proposed Protective Order would limit discovery and impair substantive rights
for reasons other than protection of classified information or camp security); see also
Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 9 (arguing that Govern-
ment's proposed order will "scuttle effective review").
196. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 5 (not-
ing that actions on behalf of prisoners frequently commence with the filing of a next
friend petition due to circumstances of detention incapacitated); see also Parhat Opp'n
to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 10-11 (arguing that prisoners' circum-
stances instill reluctance to trust attorneys and participate in U.S. legal system, and
situation is aggravated by judicial inaction). Parhat reasons:
It may be difficult for the thoughtful jurist to comprehend why, in the first
visit, an innocent prisoner would not simply "sign a form" and cheerfully dic-
tate a complete statement to his American lawyer. But the jurist has not been
in an American cage for five years. He has not been stripped naked by Ameri-
can guards; not hooded, berated, searched, nor beaten by helmeted Ameri-
cans wielding truncheons. He has not been chained to the floor, not watched
by MPs as he defecates, nor had his chambers searched regularly by Ameri-
cans; he has not been isolated from family, nor deprived of newspapers, books,
journals, and all the food of the mind, nor repeatedly promised that he is
innocent, and that he would be leaving soon. The jurist is not separated by
language and culture from Americans, and has not, after five years of this
treatment, come to mistrust them. The jurist is not meeting in a cell another
American (who claims to be a lawyer, but-who knows?-might be an interro-
gator); he is not being asked to sign a form in a foreign language that might
be anything. An entire career has taught the jurist to believe in the American
justice system and in the attorney-client relationship. But five years at Guanta-
namo has taught these petitioners that the American justice system is an illu-
sion, and that people asking him to sign things have other agendas. Id.
197. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at add. B, 30-31 (providing
rules governing access to prisoners and classified information where suit is brought on
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According to Bismullah and Parhat, the proposed order
would further interfere with the attorney-client relationship by
sharply limiting the content of what attorneys may communicate
with their clients in correspondence.19 8 The order would, for
example, limit attorney-client correspondence to documents
and drafts of documents that are intended for filing in the ac-
tion brought under the DTA, and only those related directly to
its litigation.199 As Bismullah points out, this would prohibit Bis-
mullah from writing to his attorney to report that he is being
tortured, and prevent counsel from providing the prisoner with
a copy of the DTA or a court opinion from another case, without
permitting the Government to redact it first.20
0
Bismullah also challenges language in the Proposed Protec-
tive Order that would prohibit counsel from sharing classified
and "protected" information with other prisoner counsel, even
those with security clearance, and even when such information is
critical to another prisoner's case. 2 1 Also unfair, it is argued, is
language in the Proposed Protective Order that would permit
the Government to unilaterally sanction counsel for alleged mis-
conduct in violation of the Proposed Protective Order, including
preventing access to the prisoner, without the approval of the
court.
20 2
"next friend" basis); see also supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (describing re-
strictions on "next friend" suits under Government's Proposed Protective Order).
198. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 8-9
(claiming that Proposed Protective Order places "significant burdens" on counsel ac-
cess to clients and information, including regulating the content of attorney-client cor-
respondence, prohibiting discussion of events occurring after the date of CSRT classifi-
cation, restricting counsel sharing classified or non-classified information with other
security-cleared counsel, authorizing the Government to unilaterally sanction counsel
suspected of violating the protective order, and restricting the number of visits); see also
Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 9 (arguing that Govern-
ment's proposed order will "scuttle effective review" by limiting available information to
"need to know" information).
199. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 28-29
(describing limitations imposed by Government's Proposed Protective Order).
200. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 29 (argu-
ing that Proposed Protective Order would unreasonably deny proper attorney-client
communication).
201. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 9 (not-
ing that Proposed Protective Order's restrictions would prevent counsel from sharing
classified and non-classified "protected" information, even when information is critical
to another prisoner's case).
202. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 29 (argu-
ing against section of Proposed Protective Order that would "vest in Respondent the
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c. Proposed Rules Are Arbitrary
Bismullah also argues that some aspects of the Govern-
ment's Proposed Protective Order are arbitrary; the rules pro-
posed do not correspond to any specific problem described by
the Government. 20 3 For example, he argues that the rule limit-
ing prisoners to three visits with counsel over the course of the
litigation is not backed by any evidence linking this limited num-
ber of visits to a specific national security interest, or to any indi-
cation that three visits is sufficient to prepare a case. 20 4 Likewise,
both Bismullah and Parhat claim, the Proposed Protective Or-
der's approach to designating certain non-classified information
as "protected" would seem to invite information to be classified
as such arbitrarily.
20 5
d. Proposed "Clarifications" Unlikely to Prevent Disputes
The Government argues that the Green Protective Order is
ambiguous in some areas, leading to increased litigation. 20 6
While recognizing that protective order litigation is complex
and time-consuming, Bismullah disputes the notion that the gov-
ernment's proposed "clarifications" would limit litigation, assert-
ing instead that this complexity necessitates a structure for solv-
ing such disputes, modeled after the one in place to interpret
authority "unilaterally" to terminate counsel's right to visit Bismullah, to use the legal
mail, to see classified information, and any other right or benefit available under the
terms of the protective order; characterizing this authority as "unfettered police
power").
203. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 20-21
(stating that, while Government's argument in favor of Proposed Protective Order pur-
ports to remedy "problems" with Green Protective Order, it includes "no evidence that
Respondent has sought to effect similar modifications to the form of the district court
protective order"; stating that McCarthy Declaration submitted by Government does
not correspond to "remedies" contained in Proposed Protective Order).
204. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 27 (stat-
ing that Proposed Protective Order would "arbitrarily limit" number of visits while spec-
ifying an arbitrary and likely insufficient number of client visits).
205. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 28 (argu-
ing that, under Proposed Protective Order, Government may prevent counsel from dis-
cussing any topic with Bismullah by designating it "protected information"); see also
Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 9-10 (stating that, if Gov-
ernment determines that Parhat does not have a "need to know" something in unclassi-
fied CSRT record, Parhat will have no ability to challenge this designation).
206. See Gov't Mot. for Protective Order, supra note 14, at 4-20 (arguing for stricter
controls on information and client access); Dreiling, supra note 5 (reporting on Gov-
ernment's complaints about Green Protective Order).
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the Green Protective Order.2 7
e. Attempt to Influence Outcome of Litigation
The Government's intent in establishing procedures that
would limit the scope of discovery and interfere with the attor-
ney-client relationship, as well as those that are arguably arbi-
trary, Bismullah and Parhat argue, goes beyond simply restrict-
ing information flow in the name of national security.20 8 Rather,
they maintain, these aspects of the Proposed Protective Order
are proposed so as to influence the outcome of the prisoner's
case by resolving contentious issues (such as the scope of the
review of a DTA action) by incorporating a rule favorable to the
Government into the protective order.20 9 This attempt to influ-
ence the litigation, they argue, also motivates the Government to
include provisions that would effectively eliminate petitions
brought on "next friend" standing.210
C. The Paracha Position: The Green Protective Order is
Too Restrictive
The debate over the Green Protective Order is more com-
plex than the pro and con positions articulated by Bismullah
and Parhat and the Government, respectively. 21 As shown by
207. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 15-18
(recommending Special Master for resolution of disputes, similar to in district courts).
208. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 3 (argu-
ing that Proposed Protective Order "betrays attention to litigation tactics, not camp
security"); see also Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 9-10
(arguing that Government's intent in proposing protective order may be to reduce
scope of appellate review).
209. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (suggesting Government motivated
by more than just national security concerns).
210. See Bismullah Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 22 (argu-
ing that Proposed Protective Order incorporates "flawed arguments on disputed sub-
stantive legal issues" such as the scope of the Court's review, next friend standing, and
the right to assistance of counsel under the Constitution and federal statute); see also
Parhat Opp'n to Proposed Protective Order, supra note 11, at 9-10 (criticizing Govern-
ment's efforts to limit appellate review and next friend standing).
211. To the extent that Bismullah and Parhat are currently litigating the issue of
the proper protective order against the Government, it makes sense to refer to their
positions as pro and con with respect to the Green Protective Order. It should be noted
that both parties' positions are litigation stance, and reflect a strategic calculus as well;
it is not clear whether the Government would be universally opposed to the Green
Protective Order in all possible contexts,just as it is not clear that Bismullah and Parhat
would embrace the Green Protective Order in all contexts.
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the position argued by prisoner Paracha, there is no consensus
between opponents of the Government about the merits of the
Green Protective Order.2 1 2 To Paracha, the compromise posi-
tion embodied in the Green Protective Order still deviates too
much from established procedures for dealing with classified in-
formation developed by the judiciary prior to the advent of
Guantdnamo. 213 The procedures employed by the federal judici-
ary prior to the "War on Terror," he argues, remain adequate
and should be followed for counsel representing Guantdnamo
prisoners.214 Though the Green Protective Order may be appro-
priate for some Guant~namo cases, in general it permits the
Government too much interference in the crucial attorney-client
relationship, and limits too greatly the ability of the judiciary to
resolve matters involving confidential information on an individ-
ual basis.215 Articulating his arguments against the Green Pro-
tective Order in the context of a motion to vacate that order in
his habeas corpus case, Paracha lists several objections to the
Green Protective Order.21 6 In addition, Paracha makes two sug-
gestions about what sort of protective order may be an appropri-
ate substitute for the Green order.217 Each of these objections
and suggestions will be addressed below.
1. Objections to the Green Protective Order
Generally, Paracha's objections to the Green Protective Or-
der arise from what he perceives as the court's unwarranted
deviation from established procedures by which the judiciary
212. See generally Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 10-34.
213. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 4-10 (naming a series of "long
recognized" privileges; arguing that they not be abrogated by compromise in the Guan-
tnamo context).
214. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 8-10 (arguing for sufficiency of
procedures for access to classified information in place before September 11, 2001,
particularly CIPA, and other security procedures for protecting classified information
in federal criminal cases).
215. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 10 (claiming that Green Protec-
tive Order "goes far beyond the traditional privileges" and strips Paracha of certain
essential rights.
216. The Green Protective Order was implemented in Paracha's case sua sponte. See
Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 1 (prefacing motion by objecting to entry of
Green Protective Order without notice and "unjustified as a matter of law"); see also
Paracha v. Bush, No. 04-cv-2022 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2004) (dkt. 13) (entering Green Pro-
tective Order sua sponte).
217. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 32-33 (describing permissible
protective orders as alternatives to Green Protective Order).
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handles cases involving sensitive information.218 Paracha argues
that existing doctrine governing military secrets, state secrets,
and informer's privilege, as well as the statutory rules of the Clas-
sified Information Procedures Act, do not justify the procedures
for preserving secrecy provided for in the Green Protective Or-
der. 219 Invoking the examples of several individuals, including
Army Captain James Yee, who were charged by the Government
for violating information security procedures at Guantdnamo,
Paracha further notes the aggressiveness with which the Govern-
ment prosecutes violations of its rules, and from this emphasizes
the danger posed to counsel by an overly broad protective or-
der.2 2 ° Paracha's specific concerns are as follows:
a. Requiring Clearance for Defense Counsel
The Green Protective Order requires that counsel have an
executive branch security clearance before they access certain fil-
ings and evidence, and before they are permitted to visit their
client at Guant,4namo. 221 To Paracha, this requirement unrea-
sonably limits the prisoner's right to counsel by permitting the
executive branch to interfere with the judiciary's power to super-
vise lawyers.2 2 2 Noting proposed legislation on the issue which
was not adopted, Paracha further asserts that permitting the ex-
ecutive branch to select which lawyers are to be granted security
218. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 9-10 (arguing that prior to Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the judicial branch demonstrated ample experience in protecting mil-
itary secrets, state secrets, informer's privilege, and material covered by executive
branch classification schemes, but that Green Protective Order exceeds the "traditional
privileges").
219. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 4 (discussing extent of military
secrets privilege); 6 (discussing state secrets privilege); 7 (discussing informer's privi-
lege); 8-9 (discussing CIPA and other procedures for secrecy).
220. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 19 (noting that Government has
brought charges against translators and others in contact with prisoners, especially
Capt. James Yee; noting that such charges have often been baseless, yet prosecuted with
excessive strictness).
221. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 178-79 (D.D.C. 2004)
(requiring security clearance); Gohil & Mithra, supra note 7 (describing logistical chal-
lenges to counsel posed by Green Protective Order, including security clearance re-
quirement).
222. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 20-21 (arguing that security
clearance requirement in Green Protective Order either "a useless, but costly, interfer-
ence with the independence of thejudiciary," or "an impermissible abridgement of the
right to counsel"; arguing that strict professional standards imposed on lawyers and
policed by judiciary are sufficient).
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clearance invites the arbitrary exercise of that discretion, and im-
poses an expensive, invasive, and time-consuming application
process on counsel themselves.223
b. Executive Branch Inquiry into Source of Fees
Paracha further objects to the sections of the Green Protec-
tive Order that require counsel to certify that funds received for
legal expenses are not connected to terrorism or the product of
terrorist activities.2 24 This determination, he argues, is virtually
impossible to make in practice.225 Individual situations arising
from any counsel receiving "dirty money" may be dealt with by
the court, and need not be included in a protective order.2 2 6
c. Discouraging Telephone Access to Client
The Green Protective Order provides that telephone com-
munication between prisoner and counsel will not normally be
allowed.2 2 7 Characterizing this as a limitation premised on the
Government's failure to concede the right to counsel, Paracha
argues that this rule is unreasonable, particularly given that tele-
phone is the most convenient method of communication over
long distance.228 The benefits of permitting telephone access,
he argues, outweigh the risks.22 9
223. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 21 (citing legislative history of
CIPA and criticism of CIPA articulated in Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical Review of the
Classified Information Procedures Act, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277 (1986)).
224. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 21-23 (criticizing as "dangerously
vague" Green Protective Order's requirement that funds received are not "connected to
terrorism or the product of terrorist activities"); see also In re Guantanamo Detainee
Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (forbidding funding from sources "connected to terror-
ism").
225. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 22 (reasoning that it is impossi-
ble for counsel to that certify finds received from family, organization, or individual
from prisoner's home country, are not in some way "connected to terrorism").
226. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 22 (arguing that, any counsel
funded by terrorist organization can be dealt with individually, without protective or-
der).
227. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (stating that
requests for telephone calls between counsel and prisoner will generally be denied).
228. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 23 (arguing that provision
against telephone access demonstrates Government's intent to impede access to coun-
sel; characterizing telephone communication as the normal method of attorney-client
communication today).
229. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 23 (arguing that even monitored
conversations would generally be better than no telephonic conversations).
2007] THE GUANTANAMO PROTECTIVE ORDER
d. Restrictions on What Counsel May Tell Client
The Green Protective Order limits the extent to which
counsel may divulge classified information not learned from the
prisoner to the prisoner.23 Citing federal case law for the pro-
position that communication between counsel and petitioner is
necessary to make meaningful the right to counsel, Paracha as-
serts that this provision of the Green Protective Order is "per se
wrong."231 In addition, Paracha objects to the Green Protective
Order's expansive description of prohibited communications,
which may be read to prohibit communication about innocuous
matters as well as those crucial to litigation.232
e. Restrictions on What Client May Tell Counsel, or on What
Counsel May Do with Information Learned from Client
Paracha's most vigorous arguments concern sections of the
Green Protective Order pertaining to the privilege team. 233 The
Green Protective Order provides that all information learned
from a prisoner, including oral and written communications, is
to be treated by counsel as presumptively classified. 23 14 Paracha
vehemently objects to this presumptive classification scheme,
which he claims interferes with counsel's ability to gather evi-
230. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 187 (stating, among
other restrictions, that written and oral communications with prisoners including all
incoming legal mail, "shall not include information relating to any ongoing or com-
pleted military, intelligence, security, or law enforcement operations, investigations, or
arrests, or the results of such activities, by any nation or agency or current political
events in any country that are not directly related to counsel's representation of that
detainee; or security procedures at GTMO (including names of U.S. Government per-
sonnel and the layout of camp facilities) or the status of other detainees, not directly
related to counsel's representation.").
231. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 24 (arguing that ability of coun-
sel and prisoner to confer is essence of right to counsel; citing cases including Geders v.
United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (reversing conviction where counsel ordered not to
confer with defendant during recess) and Mudd v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (holding restrictions to counsel access require reversal without showing of
specific harm)).
232. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 25 (criticizing broadness of
Green Protective Order, which purports to ban wide range of conversation topics).
233. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 25-28 (objecting to presumptive
classification of information learned from prisoner).
234. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 190 (D.D.C.
2004) (requiring that counsel treat all information learned from prisoner as classified
information unless cleared by privilege team); see also Gohil & Mithra, supra note 7
(describing requirement that counsel adhere to rules about information received or
disclosed).
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dence and communicate candidly with his client.2 5 These re-
strictions, Paracha argues, sap counsel's ability to engage in pre-
trial investigation, gather evidence, and provide zealous repre-
sentation, because they require that attorney-client communica-
tion pass through the hands of the Government, via the privilege
team. 23 6 Paracha further notes that the Green Protective Order
departs from the judiciary's usual approach to classified material
by categorizing all information received from prisoners as "born
classified," a classification previously reserved only for Govern-
ment information about atomic weapons.23 v
f. Failure to Screen Off Privilege Team and Other Limitations
on Attorney-Client Confidentiality
Paracha's objections to the privilege team established by the
Green Protective Order also reflect a concern about whether the
privilege team, operated by the Government and physically lo-
cated in close proximity to Government officials in Washington,
D.C., is adequately insulated from the Government. 238 Paracha
notes that the privilege team is not screened from other Govern-
ment lawyers in the manner in which large law firms routinely
erect internal barriers to avoid conflicts of interest.239 He also
objects to language in the Green Protective Order that requires
the privilege team to report to the Government "any informa-
tion that reasonably could be expected to result in immediate
and substantial harm to the national security," as well as certain
235. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 26-28 (claiming that restriction
forbids lawyer from investigating in search of supporting evidence and otherwise limits
counsel's ability to prepare his case).
236. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 26 (claiming that requirement
that attorney-client communication pass through hands of the Government, through
privilege team, grants Government "absolute control" over counsel's preparation of
case).
237. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 26 (claiming that only category
of information "born classified" in past was information pertaining to nuclear weap-
ons).
238. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 28-31 (claiming that privilege
team established by Green Protective Order is inadequately "screened off" from Gov-
ernment lawyers).
239. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 28-31 (objecting to lack of lan-
guage in Green Protective Order screening Government lawyers from privilege team;
objecting to language suggesting that privilege team should "collect and disseminate"
information for use with in other prisoners' cases).
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other information.24 ° To Paracha, this requires that the privi-
lege team effectively function as an intelligence-collecting arm of
the Government, particularly considering the generally expan-
sive way in which the Government tends to interpret "harm to
national security" in the Guantdnamo context.241  As such,
Paracha asserts, counsel themselves may become complicit in the
Government's collection of information; in which case, they are
not really functioning as a prisoner's advocate at all.24 2
Paracha is not, however, absolutely opposed to the notion of
a privilege team to oversee dissemination of classified informa-
tion. 243 Though not convinced that one is warranted in his case
or as a default for all Guantinamo cases, he is at least open to
the idea, provided that it is operated by a neutral agency, per-
haps the court itself, and located away from Government law-
yers.2 4 4
g. Requirement of Record Destruction
The Green Protective Order requires the destruction of cer-
tain documents following the "final conclusion" of a prisoner's
case. 241 Paracha also objects to this requirement. 246 Such docu-
ment destruction, he argues, either constitutes an unlawful tak-
ing and interference with a lawyer's work, or violates federal
240. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 189 (D.D.C. 2004)
(specifying privilege team function).
241. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 29 (arguing that exceptions
weaken assurances that privilege team will not pass information to Government; noting
that Government's rationale for holding prisoners suggests that "harm to the national
security" will be interpreted broadly).
242. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 29-30 (arguing that privilege
team reporting requirement is fatal to effective assistance of counsel; reasoning that,
under such a regime, counsel are effectively complicit in eliciting information from
prisoners).
243. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 31 (suggesting possibility of a
privilege team operated by "neutral agency").
244. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 31 (arguing that "neutral agency
... should be physically located away from the military and intelligence agencies, and
away from the Department of Justice lawyers working on these cases" Paracha would
also admit a possible exception for information-screening rules in emergency situa-
tions. See id. (describing "possible exception for emergency situations" in which privi-
lege team could disclose information).
245. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 180-81 (requiring
document destruction upon final resolution of cases).
246. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 31-32 (objecting to Green Pro-
tective Order's requirement of document destruction).
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law. 247
2. Suggestions for Appropriate Protective Order
Though critical of the Green Protective Order, Paracha is
open to some sort of protective order, implemented upon a
proper showing of need, and constructed to protect the pris-
oner's right to the assistance of counsel. 4 8 Such a protective
order could be premised not on a doctrine of national security,
but on an attorneys' ethical obligation not to further criminal
conspiracies.24 9 Given that the judiciary is already adept at han-
dling such matters, Paracha argues, a potential protective order
constructed along these lines could amount to a promise, signed
by counsel, to reveal any information about future acts of terror
or other crimes.
2 50
I1. ANALYSIS AND COMMENT
The debate over the Green Protective Order is consequent-
ial in a variety of ways. This Part first discusses some of the po-
tential ramifications of the debate. Analyzing the arguments ar-
ticulated above, this Part argues that, in deciding whether to re-
place the Green Protective Order with a more restrictive order,
the D.C. Circuit should recognize the extent to which the ex-
isting protective order has already dramatically limited prisoners
basic access to counsel-going far beyond the protective orders
in the Hanssen and Lindh cases-and should avoid limiting it fur-
ther. Finally, this Part urges counsel for Guantdnamo prisoners
to continue to make courts and the general public aware of the
restrictions placed upon their advocacy.
247. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 31 (characterizing document
destruction as potentially unlawful taking and/or violation of federal record-keeping
law).
248. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 32-34 (describing possible pro-
tective orders acceptable to Paracha).
249. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 33 (citing D.C. Bar Rule
1.6(c) (1), which allows a lawyer to reveal "confidences and secrets to the extent reason-
ably necessary to prevent a criminal act that lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result
in death or substantial bodily harm"; citing D.C. Bar Rule 1.2, which forbids attorneys to
counsel client to "engage or assist in conduct that lawyer knows is criminal or fraudu-
lent").
250. See Paracha Mot. to Vacate, supra note 12, at 32-34 (stating that, pursuant to
ethical rules, counsel could be required not to assist any criminal conduct; they could
be asked to agree not to, for example, transmit messages in foreign languages on behalf
of their client, or to transmit any messages at all except in paraphrase).
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A. Significance of the Debate
The debate about the appropriateness of the Green Protec-
tive Order is significant for a variety of reasons. Most immedi-
ately, the question of the proper protective order will affect cur-
rent and future Guantdnamo litigation. Given that, in Bismullah
and Parhat, this dispute over the proper scope of the protective
order is taking place at the Circuit level, that court's ruling will
thus be at least potentially binding on the D.C. district courts. 2 5 2
In addition, the district courts' apparent emphasis on judicial
consistency in handling prisoner cases-as evidenced by the
ubiquity of the Judge Green order-will likely lead them to fol-
low whatever decision is made in Bismullah and Parhat.253 This
debate's outcome will thus probably dictate the type of protec-
tive orders put in place in other cases, and in future cases, espe-
cially those cases brought under the DTA.2 54
Additionally, this debate is significant because its result will
influence the conduct, and likely the outcome, of some prison-
ers' cases. 25 5 To the extent that the protective order restricts ac-
cess to classified information, it restricts discovery; 256 to the ex-
tent that it restricts communication between counsel and client,
it obstructs counsel's ability to zealously represent of that cli-
ent.257 Though this is a concern in any normal case involving a
protective order, it is highly consequential in Guant,.namo litiga-
tion, in which discovery and communication are already substan-
tially challenged by logistical and cultural factors. 25 8
251. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (describing ramifications of de-
bate over Green Protective Order).
252. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (noting likelihood that district
courts will follow D.C. Circuit's ruling on protective order).
253. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (noting ubiquity of Green Protec-
tive Order).
254. See supra notes 11, 15, 168-187 and accompanying text (noting context of de-
bate in cases brought pursuant to DTA); describing Bismullah and Parhat's concerns
about consequences should Government's Proposed Protective Order become stan-
dard).
255. See supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text (characterizing Government's
Proposed Protective Order as effort to influence the outcome of cases).
256. See supra notes 37-41, 166, 168-172, 192-195 (describing potential restrictions
protective orders may place on access to information; discussing argument that Govern-
ment's Proposed Protective Order limits discovery).
257. See supra notes 173-170, 204-214 and accompanying text (discussing argument
that protective orders restrict communication between counsel and client).
258. See supra notes 12-13, 59, 64, 196 and accompanying text (describing logistical
and cultural challenges to discovery, communication, and client access).
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The outcome of this debate will likely also have an effect on
other undetermined legal questions arising from the DTA.259
For example, the scope of review of a petition brought under the
DTA remains undecided.260 Should the Bismullah Court impose
a more restrictive protective order in that case, that decision
could be construed as resolving this undecided substantive issue
through an initial procedural motion.261
Furthermore, this debate may have wide-reaching implica-
tions for cases dealing with classified information even outside
the Guantdnamo context.262 Both the Green Protective Order
and, if adopted, the Government's Proposed Protective Order,
have the potential to set an example for other cases involving
national security information. 263 The protective orders used in
Hanssen and Lindh did not restrict access to counsel in the man-
ner that the Green Protective Order does.264 The Government's
Proposed Protective Order would even further restrict access to
counsel-should it be implemented, it would have the potential
to normalize protective orders specifying terms for access to
counsel in other cases involving confidential national security in-
formation.2 6 5 Furthermore, in treating certain information-
basically, anything learned from a prisoner-as presumptively
classified, the Green Protective Order expands the class of infor-
mation that is to be treated as classified-a policy decision that
should be a matter of public discussion. 26 6 The Government's
Proposed Protective Order would expand this class even further,
259. See supra notes 16-17, 168 and accompanying text (describing unresolved in-
terpretations of recent legislation).
260. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (describing unresolved scope of
appellate review under DTA).
261. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (describing Bismullah's argument
that Government's Proposed Protective Order would constitute ruling on scope of ap-
pellate review under DTA).
262. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (noting possible implications
regarding classification of national security information).
263. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (noting potential precedent to
be set by Green Protective Order and Government's Proposed Protective Order).
264. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text (contrasting Hanssen and
Lindh protective orders with Green Protective Order).
265. See supra notes 16-17, 182, 190, 196 and accompanying text (describing possi-
ble adverse consequences if Government's Proposed Protective Order were imple-
mented).
266. See supra notes 105, 165-166, and accompanying text (describing presumptive
classification of information learned from prisoners; discussing expanding category of
classified information).
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while also endorsing a nebulous class of "protected" information
that, while apparently not classified, is restricted in some fash-
ion.26
7
On an even broader level, this debate is significant because
it engages grave legal, policy, and moral questions about the sep-
aration of powers, the robustness of the right to counsel, and the
manner in which the United States treats those in its custody,
among other serious questions.26 8 How this debate is resolved
will have profound implications for the practice of law and the
meaning of the phrase "American system of justice. '269 To the
extent that the Government's Proposed Protective Order speci-
fies rules for the handling of sensitive information that are
stricter than those normally administered by the federal
courts, 27 it would also threaten to write into law the unsavory
presumption that lawyers, usually considered trusted officers of
the court, are somehow less trustworthy if they represent a par-
ticular class of clients. 27 1
These important legal consequences should not, of course,
obscure the immediate and profound impact of this debate
upon the lives of prisoners Bismullah, Parhat, and the other pris-
oners at Guanttnamo currently represented by counsel, as well
and the lives of their families and friends. 2 7 2 These individuals
may or may not have confidence in the U.S. legal system's ability
to remedy their loved one's indefinite detention, but more re-
strictive protective order minimizing access to counsel and fur-
ther restricting communications would even further dim
267. See supra note 132-134 and accompanying text (describing new class of "pro-
tected" information under Government's Proposed Protective Order).
268. See supra notes 17-18, 59, 60-61, 63, 195-196, 220 and accompanying text (not-
ing aspects of protective order implicating separation of powers, right of access to coun-
sel, and treatment of persons in U.S. custody).
269. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (noting abuse perpetrated by U.S.
personnel at Guantanamo).
270. See supra notes 105, 165-166, 213-214 and accompanying text (describing rules
for handling sensitive information; contrasting rules applied in Guantanamo context
with previous rules).
271. See supra notes 64, 222-223 and accompanying text (noting Government's at-
tempt to malign lawyers representing prisoners at Guantanamo; describing Paracha's
argument that federal courts have long since proven their ability to deal with sensitive
information).
272. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing atmosphere of "debility,
dependence, and dread" in which prisoners exist, punctuated only by lawyer visits).
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whatever confidence in the legal system they do have.273
B. Analysis
The three assessments of the Green Protective Order de-
scribed above each recommend a way forward for future Guantu-
namo litigation. 2 74 The divergence between the three positions
suggests that a compromise position may be difficult to reach.275
Evaluating the arguments brought by each, however, and consid-
ering the dramatic consequences of a decision to adopt a more
restrictive protective order makes it clear that any compromise
between the Bismullah/Parhat and Government positions-the
positions currently before the D.C. Circuit-would ignore the al-
ready significant restrictions placed on advocacy by the Green
Protective Order.2 7 6 As the Paracha position illustrates, the
Green Protective Order is itself a compromise position that sig-
nificantly limits the ability of counsel to advocate on behalf of
their clients. 27 7 Any further restrictions beyond those imple-
mented in the Green Protective Order would be unnecessary
and unfair, and would probably encourage the Government to
continue pressing the courts to restrict access even further.278
Each of the positions discussed above will be briefly critiqued
below.
1. Critique of the Government's Position
The Government's concerns about the Green Protective Or-
der are unwarranted, and their argument for a more restrictive
273. See supra note 59, 196 and accompanying text (describing proposed changes
to protective order that would minimize counsel access; describing factors straining
prisoner confidence in legal system).
274. See supra Part 11 (describing three assessments of Green Protective Order).
275. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text (summarizing three positions
discussed in Part II).
276. See supra notes 211-217 and accompanying text (summarizing Paracha's argu-
ment against restrictions imposed by Green Protective Order).
277. See supra note 211-217 and accompanying text (summarizing Paracha's argu-
ment).
278. See supra notes 184-87, 220, 236-237 and accompanying text (discussing Bis-
mullah's assertion that Government's proposed restrictions are arbitrary and lack ade-
quate justification; describing Paracha's concern about aggressive prosecution of per-
ceived rule violations; discussing expansive limitations on advocacy articulated by
Paracha).
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order is weak.279 To begin with, the Government's argument
rests on a questionable premise: that the primary purpose of a
protective order is to prevent unauthorized disclosure or dissem-
ination of sensitive information. 280 As their general use in civil
and criminal courts shows, placing limitations on access to or use
of information is but half of their purpose; the other of a protec-
tive order's purpose is to ensure the fundamental fairness of
court proceedings by protecting counsel's access to certain sensi-
tive information.281 Ignoring this important aspect of the nature
of protective orders, the Government's position urges a mislead-
ingly one-sided approach to the question of the Green Protective
Order's relative success.28 2
As blisteringly argued by Bismullah and Parhat, the Govern-
ment's argument in favor of a more restrictive protective order is
deeply flawed by its lack of factual specifics and its reliance on
nonspecific allegations that the Green Protective Order is "un-
workable," stated by individuals who are not in a position to
judge such questions objectively. 283 Many of these allegations
arise from the simple fact that Guantdnamo prisoners have
learned information from the outside world.28 4 Setting aside the
inherent cruelty (and futility) of a policy that bans all news of
the outside world, to find flaw with the Green Protective Order's
rules governing communication between prisoners and counsel
simply because information has somehow penetrated the base
would seem to lack the necessary element of proximate cause
establishing that lawyers (and not, for example, guards or service
personnel) are responsible for such information.285 Similarly,
279. See supra notes 183-210 and accompanying text (describing Bismullah's argu-
ment about various flaws in Government's criticism of Green Protective Order).
280. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text (stating Government's posi-
tion on purpose of protective order).
281. Compare supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text (showing Government's
position on purpose of protective order), with 174-75 (noting Bismullah's position on
purpose of protective order).
282. See supra notes 125-167 and accompanying text (presenting Government's
criticism of Green Protective Order regime).
283. See supra notes 183-185 and accompanying text (criticizing Government's reli-
ance on nonspecific allegations and hearsay in arguing for stricter protective order).
284. See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text (describing Government's
finding fault with Green Protective Order because of information possessed by prison-
ers).
285. See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text (describing Government's
finding fault with Green Protective Order because of information possessed by prison-
ers).
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the Government's problems with "content contraband" in the le-
gal mail system seem to have more to do with the Government's
frustrated aspirations to total information control at Guantd-
namo than they do with the provisions of the Green Protective
Order dictating the processes for handling legal mail. 28 6 Their
arguments about the "unworkable" handling of next friend cases
have no apparent factual justification. 8 v
Designed to remedy the supposed flaws of the Green Protec-
tive Order, the Government's Proposed Protective Order is too
broad for that purpose. 28 As Bismullah and Parhat persuasively
argue, the Proposed Protective Order not only unnecessarily lim-
its counsel's access to information, it effectively limits the scope
of discovery and interferes with the attorney-client relation-
ship.2 9 Effectively hard-wiring a result favorable to the Govern-
ment into the rules governing the conduct of Guantdnamo
cases, the Government's proposed Order goes far beyond what is
necessary to address the Government's allegations about
problems with the Green Protective order justified. 290
2. Critique of the Bismullah/Parhat Position
The Bismullah/Parhat position is particularly valuable in
that it is the most direct illustration of the flaws of the Govern-
ment's position, as well as the dramatic consequences likely to
occur should the Green Protective Order be replaced. 29' As
such, the Bismullah/Parhat position draws important attention
to the extent to which the Government's Proposed Protective
Order, even more than the Green Protective Order, imposes ag-
286. See supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text (describing Government's
complaints about legal mail system under Green Protective Order).
287. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (noting lack of factual justification
for Government's asserted problems with "next friend" counsel visits).
288. See supra notes 184-185 accompanying text (describing various ways in which
Government's Proposed Protective Order addresses more flaws than it establishes ex-
ist).
289. See supra notes 191-192, 196-197, 218-220 and accompanying text (discussing
argument that Government's Proposed Protective Order limits discovery and chal-
lenges attorney-client relationship).
290. See supra notes 184-185, 191-192, 196-197, 218-220 and accompanying text
(criticizing Government's reliance on nonspecific allegations and hearsay in arguing
for stricter protective order).
291. See supra Part II(B) (describing Bismullah and Parhat positions).
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gressive restrictions on the prisoners' access to counsel.2 9 2 In do-
ing so, both the Green Protective Order and the Government's
Proposed Protective Order dramatically depart from the protec-
tive orders implemented in the Hanssen and Lindh cases.293 Fur-
thermore, the arguments articulated by Bismullah and Parhat ar-
gument demonstrate that access to counsel is not the only area
in which the Government seeks to use the protective order as
leverage in litigating the case. 294 For example, as Bismullah and
Parhat assert, the Government's Proposed Protective Order
would, in effect, establish a standard of review in DTA cases with-
out the court having directly considered the issue. 29 5 Likewise,
as the Bismullah/Parhat position notes, some of the rules pro-
posed by the Government are arbitrary and correspond in no
way to the allegations made by the Government about how the
Green Protective Order has failed; this, too, would suggest an
effort to achieve through litigation of the protective order what
the Government cannot achieve otherwise.296
The Bismullah/Parhat position could be stronger, however,
if it amplified to a greater degree the extent to which the Green
Protective Order already significantly constrains counsel repre-
senting Guantdnamo prisoners. 297 Though reminding us that
the Green Protective Order was the product of lengthy negotia-
tion and compromise, it should articulate more strongly exactly
what counsel gave up in those negotiations, and how the com-
promises built into the Green Protective Order make further
compromise unfair. 298
292. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text (summarizing Bismullah's ar-
gument about restrictions on access to counsel).
293. See-supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text (summarizing differences be-
tween Lindh Protective order, Hanssen Protective Order, Green Protective Order, and
Government's Proposed Protective Order).
294. See supra notes 187, 220, 241 and accompanying text (noting various ways in
which Government seeks to use protective order litigation to its advantage).
295. See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text (describing Bismullah's argu-
ment that Government's Proposed Protective Order would constitute ruling on scope
of appellate review under DTA).
296. See supra notes 184-185, 187, 191-192, 196-197, 218-220, 220, 241 and accom-
panying text (describing unjustified and arbitrary character of some of Government's
proposed rules; noting concern about Government attempting to use protective order
for litigation advantage).
297. See supra notes 211-217 and accompanying text (summarizing significant limi-
tations on advocacy articulated by Paracha).
298. See supra notes 218-250 and accompanying text (discussing in detail Paracha's
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3. Critique of the Paracha Position
Though not articulated in the context of a Government mo-
tion for a protective order even more restrictive than the Green
Protective Order, the Paracha assessment of the Green Protec-
tive Order clarifies precisely how limiting to counsel access that
order is. 29 9 In doing so, it rightly emphasizes that courts have
long fashioned measures for protecting confidential national se-
curity information, and done so without needing to go to the
lengths required by the Green Protective Order.3 ° ° Indeed, the
correctness of this approach is demonstrated by the measures for
handling confidential information embodied in the Hanssen and
Lindh protective orders.3 °' Paracha is also well-justified in ob-
jecting to the Green Protective Order's rules treating all infor-
mation received from a prisoner as presumptively classified.3 °2
Finally, Paracha's suggestions for an appropriate protective or-
der built upon the rules of ethics would solve the problem of
access to classified information without compromising the attor-
ney-client relationship. 3
The weakness of the Paracha position is that it is not more
broadly articulated. Paracha's criticism of the Green Protective
Order is sound, and deserves to be heard by those evaluating the
merits of the Green Protective Order. All counsel familiar with
the Green Protective Order understand its limitations. 304 They
should not be hesitant to speak out about them.
CONCLUSION
The Green Protective Order is both central to GuantAnamo
argument about constraints on counsel, including privilege team, legal mail access, and
other restrictions on communication).
299. See supra notes notes 211-217 and accompanying text (summarizing signifi-
cant limitations on advocacy articulated by Paracha).
300. See supra notes 222-223 and accompanying text (describing Paracha's argu-
ments that federal courts have long since proven their ability to deal with sensitive infor-
mation).
301. See supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text (describing general approach of
federal courts to protective orders governing classified information).
302. See supra notes 105, 165-166 and accompanying text (describing presumptive
classification of information learned from prisoners).
303. See supra notes 244, 249 and accompanying text (suggesting protective order
built upon rules of ethical conduct for attorneys).
304. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting broad familiarity of counsel
with limitations of Green Protective Order).
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litigation and highly controversial. Its restrictions on counsel ac-
cess are noteworthy and apparently unprecedented. The new,
more restrictive, Proposed Protective Order, however, would
have even more profound consequences on the nature of Guan-
tnamo litigation. As this Note shows, compromise between the
proponents and detractors of the Green Protective Order may
be neither possible nor advisable, given the degree to which the
Green Protective Order already restricts counsel access. Rather,
this Note urges, counsel for the prisoners at Guantdinamo should
continue to make the courts and the public aware of the limita-
tions on representation already imposed by the Green Protective
Order.

